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I.

INTRODUCTION

The law of the past cannot be
eluded,
The law of the present andfuture
cannot be eluded,
The law of the living cannot be
eluded-it is eternal.
-Walt Whitman'
The essence of the law finds expression in the many forms of statutes, cases, rules, regulations, and codes which serve as guides to the
citizenry and ensure that societal order is maintained.
The essence of the physical human being finds expression in the
elaborate molecular processes that direct the function and appearance of
our bodies and minds. To unlock the secret of these processes and thus
discover the specific makeup of the human being would truly be an extraordinary mark of achievement for the application of the human intellect.
This endeavor is precisely what hundreds of scientists are striving
to accomplish under the rubric of an awesome worldwide effort-the
Human Genome Project.2 The primary goal of the Human Genome
Project is to locate and decipher approximately 100,000 genes3 which
1. THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 230 (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986) (quoting
Walt Whitman, To Think of Time, 1855).
2. The Human Genome Project is also commonly referred to as the Human Genome Initiative. Throughout this Note, Human Genome Project will be used to refer to both. See George P.
Smith, II, Accessing Genomic Information or Safeguarding Genetic Privacy, 9 J.L. & HEALTH
121, 126 (1994-1995). The Human Genome Project is a cooperative undertaking which, when
completed, will provide a complete map of all genes that make up the human being, in essence, a
human "blueprint." See ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE HUMAN BLUEPRINT: THE RACE TO UNLOCK THE
SECRETS OF OUR GENEnC ScRnr 105-10 (1991).
3. See Smith, supra note 2, at 126; see also The Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., The
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make up the human genome.4 Once completed, scientists hope to better
understand the functioning of the human genome and apply this knowl-

edge to the improvement of human health through the treatment and
prevention of genetic disease.5

In order to facilitate this goal, practical application of the technology includes the development and improvement of genetic screening
capabilities. This Note addresses whether genetic screening for particular diseases should be mandatory or voluntary. A balancing analysis will
frame the legal implications of this question and will include the follow-

ing issues: (1) whether the state, under its police power to protect the
public health, can use new genetic assessments to justify implementing
a mandatory screening program; (2) the impact of such a program on
individual privacy rights of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, autonomous decision-making, and selective disclosure; and (3)
whether a mandatory screening program is the least restrictive alterna-

tive under certain circumstances. The analysis will conclude with a balancing of these issues, revealing that a mandatory testing program is not

the least restrictive alternative, even under circumstances where the
state's interest rises to the level of compelling.
In order to provide a foundation for understanding the importance
Human Genome Project (visited Jan. 9, 1998) <http.lwww.nhgri.nih.gov/HGP/> [hereinafter Human Genome Project] (providing the most up to date information regarding the Human Genome
Project).
4. "'The human genome is the complete set of instructions for making a human being."'
Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt: Scientists Launch a $3 Billion Projectto Map the Chromosomes and
Decipher the Complete Instructionsfor Making a Human Being, TMlE, Mar. 20, 1989, at 62
(quoting biochemist Robert Sinsheimer of the University of California at Santa Barbara). "The
human genome refers simply to the twenty-three pairs of chromosomes that all humans carry
within which all human genes reside-and, more specifically, those genes that contribute directly
to traits such as height, eye color, the shape of body parts, and human behavior." George P. Smith,
I & Thaddeus J. Bums, Genetic Determinism or Genetic Discrimination,11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 23, 29 (1994); see also Michael Kirby, The Human Genome Project-Promiseand
Problems, 11 J. CONTEM. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 8 (1994) (discussing the broad and daunting
scope of the Human Genome Project).
5. See The Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., UnderstandingOur Genetic Inheritance
(visited Jan. 9, 1998) <http:/lwww.nhgri.nih.govIHGPIHGP-goalsl5yrplan.html>
[hereinafter UnderstandingOur Genetic Inheritance];see also Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Mapping the Human
Genome, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 579, 584-85 (1991) (discussing the implications of the Human
Genome Project and its potential contribution to the treatment of genetic diseases); L.J. Deftos,
Genomic Torts: The Law of the Future-The Duty of Physiciansto Disclose the Presence of a Genetic Disease to the Relatives of Their Parents with the Disease, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 108
(1997) (noting that among the goals of the Human Genome Project are the "development of diagnostic tests and treatment methods for the thousands of diseases having a genetic basis"); cf. Evelyn Fox Keller, Nature, Nurture, and the Human Genome Project, in THE CODE OF CODES:
SciENTIFcI AND SociAL IssuEs iN THE HuMAN GENomE PROJECr 281, 295-96 (Daniel J. Kelves &
Leroy Hood eds., 1992).
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of scientific advancements yielded by the Human Genome Project and
how this science supports the state's interest in public genetic health, it
is necessary to have a basic understanding of genetics and of the potential of advancements in genetic technology. The science of genetics
provides the framework for the Human Genome Project and is the foundation for the development of accurate genetic testing methods. Part II
of this Note explains the role that DNA plays in genome technologies
and provides an overview of the Human Genome Project. Part Ill presents the legal foundation for the state's interest in the public health and
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy interests of individuals.
Here, the state's broad police power to contain communicable disease 6
is contrasted against the individual's right to avoid unreasonable
searches and to make autonomous decisions about personal health and
family health matters. Examples of past and present screening provisions are examined in those instances where the state has successfully
implemented mandatory testing. Similarly, those instances where the
state interest in protecting the public health had to yield to individual
fundamental rights of privacy and autonomy are also explored.
Part IV applies the legal framework to the question of whether the
state may constitutionally mandate specific genetic screening tests at
this time under its police power to protect the public health. Various
state interests are addressed, including preventative care through early
detection and reduction of the occurrence of inheritable diseases. The
state's interest in potential life is also considered because genetic diseases are transmitted through reproduction.7 Next, the implications on
an individual's privacy rights are addressed in the context of each of
these state interests. Special attention is given to the necessity of confidentiality for genetic information and the fear of discrimination from
the unauthorized release of such information to insurers or employers.
Part V of this Note balances the state interest against individual
privacy rights in the context of mandatory screening. Examples of previous screening programs are referenced in order to ascertain the types
of elements necessary to support a state-mandated testing program.
Special consideration is given to the impact of genetic screening on re-

6. A communicable disease is one which can be transmitted from one person to another.
See Holly A. Rosencranz & Warren G. Lavey, Treating Patients with Communicable Diseases:
LimitingLiabilityfor Physicians and Safeguarding the PublicHealth, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J 75, 75
n.1 (1987).
7. There are many issues surrounding reproductive genetics, however, this discussion focuses on the implications of genetic technology as applied to the screening of the pregnant mother,
fetus, or newborn.
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productive decision-making as scientific advancements may change
foundational notions that have been considered in past legal analyses.'
This section concludes that a mandatory testing program at this time is
unlikely to withstand constitutional scrutiny because the mandatory nature of the screening program unduly interferes with an individual's privacy rights and is not the least restrictive alternative.
Part VI suggests the implementation of a voluntary screening program as an alternative to mandatory testing for genetic disease. Necessary components and related services are outlined. This analysis concludes that a voluntary testing program achieves state goals while
preserving the individual's privacy in personal decisions regarding
health.

Ul. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
A.

DNA-Crafting the Human Composition

The human body is comprised of millions of cells that perform a
variety of functions.9 For example, some cells are responsible for
growing hair, while others are responsible for fighting off disease.
These cells work together, enabling our bodies to act as a single entity-the human being.'0 But how do these cells know which tasks to
perform and when? In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick discovered that within the nucleus of each cell are chromosomes containing
deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA." This substance gives each cell the
"directions" necessary to perform its specific functions as well as the
directions necessary to coordinate those tasks within the larger workings

8. For example, scientific advancements may change the concept of viability, thereby altering a woman's rights regarding abortion options. See Mark J. Buetler, Comment, Abortion and the
Viability Standard-Towarda More Reasoned Determinationof the State's CountervailingInterest in ProtectingPrenatalLife, 21 SETON HALL L. Ry. 347, 362-63 (1991); cf Michael J. Malinowski, Coming into Being: Law, Ethics, and the Practice of PrenatalGenetic Screening, 45

HASTINGS U. 1435, 1484 (1994) (suggesting that in the case of an unhealthy fetus, the state interest in preserving potential life is lessened, and perhaps "the viability cut-off for abortion should be
removed... since the parents of a severely impaired newborn generally are given the option of
withholding aggressive health treatment" that might otherwise save the child (emphasis added)).
9.

See JOSEPH LEVINE & DAViD SUZUKI, THE SECREr OF LIFE: REDESIGNING THE LVING

WORLD 11 (1993).
10. See id.
11. See JAMES D. WATSON, MOLECuLAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 53 (3d ed. 1977); J. Clay
Smith, Jr., The PrecariousImplications of DNA Profiling, 55 U. Pr. L. REV. 865, 868 n.13

(1994); Smith & Burns, supra note 4, at 23-24.
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of the human body.1
The Watson-Crick Model'3 gave insight into the formulation and
functioning of the double-helix structure of DNA. According to the
model, DNA is comprised of two components. The first is a sugarphosphorus chain,' 4 and the second component is a group of four basic
units called nucleotides, which extend horizontally from the sugarphosphorus chain; the four bases are adenine (A), guanine (G), thymine
(T), and Cystosine (C).'" There are two sets of the chain-base combination, and the bases from each chain attract each other and always pair up
in the exact same way: (A) always pairs with (T), and (G) always pairs
with (C). As the bases pair up, the chains wrap around one another, thus
forming the familiar double-helix shape.
DNA's base pairs are the language through which it communicates
messages to cells. Because there are only four elements that comprise
DNA, it is necessary for DNA to encode its detailed directions in very
long sequences of base pairs.' 6 For example, it is estimated that a typical
small gene contains at least 3,000 base pairs and that each human cell
contains roughly three to six billion base pairs.
DNA is important because it is the building block upon which the
production and maintenance of many of our body's essential elements,
including proteins, occurs. For example, DNA bases group together to
form amino acids which then combine to determine the function of
proteins in our bodies. Proteins are responsible in large part for the
formation of the human body, with some proteins serving as messengers
delivering information from one part of our body to another.'9 An understanding of DNA and its processes is therefore essential to a complete understanding of how the body functions. With an increasing un12. See LEVINE & SuLzuKI, supra note 9, at 18.
13. See ELOF AxEL CARLSON, HUMAN GENETICS 336-39 (1984).
14. See LEVINE & SUzUKI, supra note 9, at 16-17.
15. See WATSON, supra note 11, at 208-13.
16. See LEVNE& SuzulK, supra note 9, at 18.
17. See id. In order for a DNA sequence to be "unique" in the human genome, "[tihe DNA
sequence must have a probability of occurrence of less than once in three billion nucleotides."
Anita Varma & David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance Between
Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 53, 61-62 (1996).
18. See THOMAS E. CREIGHTON, PROTEINS: STRuCrUREs AND MOLECULAR PRINCIPLES 6162(1983).
19. See LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 19. For example, proteins are the foundation for
our skin and many of our organs. They send messages "from head to toe" allowing us to move our
arms, walk, and run. See id. The DNA itself does not create the amino acids necessary for the formulation of proteins, rather, DNA transcribes itself onto messenger ribonucleic acid (RNA) which
carries the information into a ribosome where the directions are decoded and the appropriate molecular compositions are created. See id. at 20.
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derstanding of the processes through which DNA commands the body,
scientists are aiming to construct a complete map"0 of the human
genome and graph the inter-relationships
between cells, genes, and the
2

functions of the human body. '
Self-knowledge about the human genome is an important compo-

nent in understanding the human's place within the environment, as

well as in sustaining our well-being within that environment by combating the genetic diseases which plague us. A deeper understanding of
DNA and its functions gives humans the power to potentially recreate

DNA or DNA-like functions' and to use this power to account for any
shortcomings and errors within the normal functioning of the human
body. ' In fact, scientists today are already successfully manipulating
DNA, albeit in a somewhat limited fashion.u
As scientists continue to study DNA intelligence, they hope to understand how DNA composes its directions to all types of cells. This
greater understanding will enable scientists to improve the human

condition.22 With this goal in mind, the Human Genome Project was
created.
B. The Human Genome Project

In 1990, the Human Genome Project officially commenced in the
United States under the joint efforts of the Department of Energy
("DOE") and the National Institutes of Health ("N'H").26 The Human
20. "Mapping" is defined as locating a particular gene on a particular chromosome. See John
C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethics, Law, and Medical Genetics: After the Human Genome Is
Mapped, 39 EMORY L.J. 747,754 (1990).
21. See UnderstandingOur Genetic Inheritance,supra note 5.
22. For example, scientists can recreate DNA-like functions by "cutting and pasting" DNA
pairs together in order to replicate a desired sequence through the use of the enzyme reverse transcriptase. See LEVm & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 24-25. This process, whereby an enzyme on
RNA assembles a complimentary strand of DNA, is of vital importance because it imitates the
process by which many incurable retroviruses infect human cells and then quickly replicate. See
id. Scientists can also clone certain genes through Polymerase Chain Reactions. See Norman A.
Doggett, The Polymerase Chain Reaction and Sequence-tagged Sites, in THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT: DECIPHERINGTHE BLUEPRINT OFHEREDrY 128, 128 (Necia Grant Cooper ed., 1994).
23. See LEVINE & SUZUKI, supranote 9, at 23-25.
24. See supra note 22.
25. "[K]nowledge [of the human genome] will undoubtedly revolutionize understanding of
human development, including the development of both normal characteristics ... and abnormal
ones, such as disease. It will transform our capacities to predict what we may become and, ultimately, it may enable us to enhance or prevent our genetic fates ....
Daniel J. Kelves & Leroy
Hood, THE CODE OF CODES: ScIENTIc AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECr,
supra note 5, at vii.
26. See Smith & Bums, supra note 4, at 29; Understanding Our Genetic Inheritance,supra
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Genome Project's main goal is to comprise a thorough map of the human genome, which is comprised over three to six billion DNA base
pairs, 27 in order to "further our basic understanding of human genetics
and of the role of various genes in health and disease.2' This map will
serve as "the source book for biomedical science in the 21st century and
will be of immense benefit ...[in] understand[ing] and eventually
treat[ing] many of the more than 4,000 genetic diseases that afflict

mankind, as well as the many multifactorial29 diseases in which genetic
predisposition plays an important role."30
This endeavor has been described by some as the "holy grail" of
life because deciphering the human genome will reveal all there is to
know about the biological composition of the human being."

"Evolution, disease, everything will be based on what's in that magnificent tape called DNA."32 These ambitious results have likened the Human Genome Project to such past pioneering scientific programs as the
33
lunar landing and the invention of the first nuclear weapon.
Two preliminary objectives need to be achieved before the Human
Genome Project can reach its ultimate goal, that of mapping and understanding the human genome First, the Human Genome Project aims to

produce a high resolution genetic map of the genetic markers making up
the twenty-three chromosomes of the human genome

5

In other words,

note 5. The National Human Genome Research Institute, originally established in 1987 as The
National Center for Human Genome Research, was formed by the NIH to manage and monitor the
project's goals, technology, funding, and public relations issues. See Jon Beckwith, Foreword:The
Human Genome Initiative: Genetics' Lightning Rod, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 3 n.15 (1991); Understanding Our Genetic Inheritance,supra note 5. This office is an outgrowth of the office of
Human Genome Research also originally formed by the NIH. See Beckwith, supra; Understanding
Our GeneticInheritance,supranote 5.
27. See LEVINE & SuzuKI, supra note 9, at 30; Smith & Bums, supra note 4, at 24; Understanding Our Genetic Inheritance,supra note 5.
28. Understanding Our Genetic Inheritance, supra note 5; see generally Beckwith, supra
note 26 (discussing the far-reaching impact of the Human Genome Project); Dan W. Brock, The
Human Genome Projectand Human Identity, 29 Hous. L. Rnv. 7, 20 (1992) (same).
29. Multifactorial traits are those which depend on both genetic and environmental factors.
See Vicki G. Norton, Comment, UnnaturalSelection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation Genetic
Screeningand ProposedRegulation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1581, 1592 n.61 (1994).
30. Understanding Our GeneticInheritance,supra note 5.
31. See LEvINE& SuzuKi, supranote 9, at 30; Beckwith, supra note 26, at 1.
32. Jaroff, supra note 4, at 63 (quoting George Cahill, a vice-president at the Howard
Hughes Medical Institute).
33. See Beckwith, supra note 26, at 1; James D. Watson, The Human Genome Project:Past,
Present,and Future,SCIENCE, Apr. 6, 1990, at 44,44.
34. See LEVINE & SuzuKI, supra note 9,at 30.
35. A genetic marker is a specific set of base pair sequences which describes a particular
"code" of directions for a cell. See id.
It is important to note that the "human" genes which are being mapped are not those of any
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the three billion base pairs comprising the twenty-three human chromosomes will be identified as part of a linear pattern.36 Second, various
physical "learning" maps of all human chromosomes and of the DNA of
selected model organisms will be produced." These maps will be combined in order to aid scientists in understanding the "big picture" of the
human genome. The integrated map will demarcate the location of individual genes within the genome, while correlating maps will illustrate
the genetic linkages (how various pieces of DNA fit together) between
these 100,000 genes.3" "Once this integrated map is available, locations39
can be established for genes with identified phenotypic expressions,
including disorders or predisposition for genetic diseases.' '0 As of 1993,
approximately 2,736 of the targeted genes had been mapped,4 and the
rest of the genes are scheduled to be completely mapped by 2 0 0 5 4
The Initiative's total cost is estimated to be about three billion

one human but are a collection of samples that have been acquired and grown in laboratories over
an extended period of time. See Fletcher & Wertz,supra note 20, at 754.
36. See Alastair T. Res, The Human Genome Project: A Challenge to the Human Rights
Framework,9 HARV.HUM. RTS. J. 27, 29 (1996).
37. Scientists presume that functionally important DNA is present among humans as well as
other organisms, and that by comparing these pieces of DNA among and between various organisms as against the standard set forth by the human genome map, greater insight into the workings
of DNA sequences can be gained. See UnderstandingOur Genetic Inheritance,supra note 5.
38. Of course, a thorough map cannot be created until scientists determine the complete sequence of human DNA and the DNA of all of the model organisms chosen; so by necessity, this
goal is inherent in the Human Genome Project's plan. It is important to note that some of the
functions of human DNA have already been discovered through experimentation and research on
yeast and other organisms. See LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 10-12. This fact buttresses the
theory that the DNA found in all living organisms derives from one common ancestor and continues to enable scientists to link human life within the full panorama of life upon Earth. See id.
Overwhelming similarity at the molecular level testifies that life's information storage
system appeared only once. Our genes resemble those of other organisms because the
genes in all of us are descendants of the genes once carried by our common ancestor
...who lived more than 3.5 billion years ago. The line of descent is unbroken, the web
of relationships irrefutable.
Id. at 33.
39. A phenotype is the variant of inheritable traits of an individual; it includes observable
features such as skin color, height, and eye color. See Robert P. Wagner, UnderstandingInheri.
tance: An Introduction to Classicaland Molecular Genetics, in THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT:
DECIPHERING THE BLUEPRINT OF HEREDrrY, supra note 22, at 1, 18-21.
40. Iles,
supra note 36, at 30. In addition to the actual production of these maps, scientists
are working with biotech companies and other computer programmers to improve the "informatics
and DNA sequencing techniques with the hope that their cost, accuracy and facility of use will
make the sequencing of the genome of any organism a relatively easy task." Beckwith, supra note
26, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
41. See Smith, supra note 2, at 126.
42. See Iles,
supra note 36, at 29.
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dollars.43 Many biotechnology companies, however, are contributing to
defray the costs of the Human Genome Project in return for shared
rights to the new information." For example, biotechnology companies
are paying high prices for the rights to access valuable genome information which they can use in the development of gene therapy treatments for various diseases. Indeed, "[t]reatment of people with DNAbased gene therapy has ... market potential: tests to detect DNA defects
of such diseases as cystic fibrosis or colon cancer are predicted to become a multi-billion dollar industry .... ,4 In addition, as technology
advances, long-term goals are likely to include the efficient production
of personal genetic profiles. 6 In order to reach such goals, the development and refinement of genetic screening techniques is necessary to
identify the presence or predisposition of genetic disease within an individual's genome. It would seem then that the development and use of
genetic screening is a logical stepping stone in the application of advanced genetic technologies designed for the purpose of promoting or
protecting the public health.
Ill.

A.

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR SCREENING PROGRAMS

State Interest in Regulating the PublicHealth

It is well established that the police power of the states includes the
power to regulate the public health and welfaref Specifically, the
43. See

ROBERT N. PROCrOR, VALUE-FREE SCIENCE?: PURITY AND POWER IN MODERN
5 (1991); Jaroff, supra note 4, at 63. The coordinators of the project, such as the
DOE and NIH, are receiving federal funding as well as support from biotechnology companies.
KNOWLEDGE

See id.

"The decision to continuously fund this Initiative, the largest biology project in the history
of science, at a time of significant budgetary constraints suggests its political currency." Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudenceof Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313, 314
(1992). Based on such strong national support for the Human Genome Project and the new genetic
technologies gained from it, states may claim to have a compelling interest in mandating genetic
screening for the protection of the public health. See infra Part IV.A.
44. "The Human Genome Project ... is still [many years] from completion. But in a rapid
blurring of big science and big business, the effort has already created its first millionaires." Lawrence M. Fisher, Profits and Ethics Clash in Research on Genetic Coding, N.Y. TIMsES, Jan. 30,

1994, at 1.
45. Varma & Abraham, supra note 17, at 54 n.l.
46. See PHLip KrrCHER, THE LtvEs TO COME: THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN
PossmLIIES 173-77 (1996). While Kitcher's proposal for the genetic profiling of the entire
population may not occur for some time, the use of genetic profiles in somewhat limited circumstances involving employment and insurance could transpire shortly. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
47. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 375 (1926). "The Powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
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power to regulate the public health has been described by the Supreme
Court as the power to "enact quarantine laws and 'health laws of every
description."' 48 In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized regulation of public health as a matter of local concern which can be most efficiently and advantageously regulated by the state.49
The leading case setting forth the underlying principles supporting
the state's power to regulate the public health is Jacobson v. Massachusettsa° There, the Supreme Court, in 1905, upheld a mandatory vaccination statute for smallpox on the ground that the state had the authority to
enact the statute under its police power.5' Importantly, the Supreme
Court declared that the states' police power to protect the public health
is broad, and that it is not for the courts to consider whether the method
employed by the legislature to effectuate this purpose was the best
method; rather, the Court's sole inquiry was whether it was reasonably
related to the state objective. 52 Courts in the early twentieth century
continued to follow the example set forth in Jacobson and presumed
legislation to be valid if a reasonable relationship existed between the
statute and the government objective. 3 In addition, courts allowed
popular belief rather than scientific knowledge to determine the reasonableness of the legislative regulations.4
Since Jacobson, advancements in medical technology have not
been sufficiently reflected by cases involving the state interest in regulating public health, specifically with regard to the control of contagious
disease. The following paragraphs present a survey of the various public
screening measures that states have taken to control disease under the

to the States respectively ....
U.S. CONST. amend X. For a thorough discussion on the origins,
scope, and limits of the state police power, see CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE
LMATIONS OFPOLICEPOWER iNTHE UNrED STATES (Da Capo Press 1971) (1886).
48. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1,203 (1824)).
49. See Walter E. Schuler, Note, The Erisa Pre-emption Narrows: Analysis of New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and Its Impact on State Regulation of Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783, 786 (1996) (surveying Supreme Court cases which recognize the states' power to regulate health care).
50. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
51. Seeid.at25.
52. See id. at 25, 35.
53. See, e.g., Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 380 (1915) (upholding a California statute
limiting the number of hours women could work in certain types of employment).
54. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35 ("'[T]he Legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases .... [For what the people believe is for the common welfare must be accepted as tending to
promote the common welfare, whether is does in fact or not."' (quoting Viemeister v. White, 72
N.E. 97,99 (N.Y. 1904))).
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auspices of police power. These examples will illustrate the courts' efforts to expand judicial construction of the Constitution to afford citizens more constitutionally protected rights, such as privacy. The extension of constitutional rights gave rise to the strict scrutiny standard,
under which the state must have a compelling interest supporting a
statute which is narrowly tailored to effectuate its purpose. s However,

the survey will reveal that public opinion, rather than advancements in
technology, still pervade much of legislative decision-making.

1. Sickle Cell Anemia Testing
In the 1970s, some states implemented compulsory sickle cell
anemia ("SCA") testing on African-American adults.16 The effort was
undertaken after medical assessment isolated African-Americans as the

group most at risk for this disease. The goal of the mandatory testing
program was to identify "carriers of a single copy of a mutated gene

which poses no risk to them, but would pose a major risk to their offspring should two carriers marry."' In distinguishing a particular social
group by genetic disease, the screening program fostered discrimination
against African-Americans, thereby reducing access to medical services,
education, and higher paying jobs. 5' For example, with racial tension

contributing to the stigmatizing effects of such testing, many AfricanAmericans, even those who were asymptomatic and merely predisposed
to the anemia, lost their jobs or were denied adequate health care benefits. 9 Although the states' interests were legitimate, the goals of mandatory testing were thwarted by its discriminatory effects.

55. See infra Part IV.A.
56. See PHmLP REI.LY, GENETCS, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLCY 68-72 (1977). Some commentators have pointed out that one of the reasons why the compulsory testing failed was because the
tests themselves were premature in that they were not developed enough to accurately test for the
actual disease. See Cynthia Smith Adelman, Note, The Constitutionality of Mandatory Genetic
Screening Statutes, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 897, 912 (1981). "The SCA test could not differentiate between those persons afflicted with sickle cell disease and those individuals merely carrying
the sickle cell trait." Id. In addition, testing during the 1970s was often performed without consent
and with little
or no regard for confidentiality of patients identity and results. See LEvIN, &
SUzUKI, supra note 9, at 202-03.
57. Philip R. Reilly, Public Policy and Legal Issues Raised by Advances in Genetic Screening and Testing, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1327, 1331-32 (1993).
58. See Iles, supra note 36, at 27.
59. See LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 202-03. In addition, it is important to note that
many of those tested suffered from detrimental psychological ramifications due to the lack of pretest counseling and education and the unavailability of post-test medical solutions. See id.at 203.
Due to these and many other shortcomings of the program, the mandatory testing of adults has
since been repealed; however, mandatory testing for newborns has withstood Constitutional scrutiny. See infra text accompanying notes 108-21.
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Congress responded to these pressures by enacting the National

Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act ("Control Act") in 1972.60 The goals of
the Control Act were to "establish a national program for diagnosis,

prevention, and treatment of sickle cell anemia" while providing the
necessary counseling and education, as well as confidentiality of
screening results. 61 Most notably, the Control Act repealed the mandatory nature of any state SCA screening statute and made such testing

voluntary.62

2. Communicable Diseases
a. Vaccinations
Another area which the state has traditionally regulated is the prevention and spread of communicable diseases. As early as 1905, Jacobson v. Massachusetts63 recognized the right of the state, via the police

power, to enact narrowly tailored public health laws deemed necessary
to safeguard the public health and welfare, even though they infringed
on individual rights' 4 In Jacobson, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, upheld a Massachusetts state statute which mandated vaccinations for smallpox.6 The plaintiff, who was in perfect health, refused the

free vaccination on the grounds that submission to it violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.6 The Court rejected this argument and recognized the authority of the state "to enact... 'health laws of every de-

60. Pub. L. No. 92-294, 86 Stat. 136 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300b) (repealed 1976).
61. H.R. REP. No. 92-923, at 1 (1975).
62. See id.at 2; National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act § 3(c). Further refinements were
made with regard to SCA testing. The Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act was repealed in 1976 and
replaced with the National Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley's Anemia, Tay-Sachs, and Genetic Diseases Act, Pub. L. No. 94-278, § 401, 90 Stat. 407 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300b (1994)). Finally, in 1978, Congress expanded this Act to include a broader scope of genetic
diseases, including cystic fibrosis and "genetic conditions leading to mental retardation or ...
mental disorders." 42 U.S.C. § 300b-1 Congressional Declaration of Purpose (1994). The Control
Act also provided for continued research and development of genetic "programs for diagnosis,
treatment,... and screening." Id. § 300b-6. This goal was designed to be achieved through the
provision of such services as "1. Early detection of disease: (a) Newborn Screening, (b) Prenatal
Screening, (c) Prenatal Diagnosis, (d) Screening at later ages; 2. Carrier detection; 3. Counseling;
4. Diagnosis and monitoring effectiveness of treatment; and 5. Information and education." S. REp.
No. 95-860, at 33-34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9134,9166-67.
63. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 39.
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scription"' 67 so long as they are not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.6
b. Quarantine
Many courts after Jacobson continued to grant states broad power
to regulate the public health based on a "reasonably related" standard; 69
the power of the states to quarantine individuals fell under this power.
In the most extreme example, the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the quarantine of a woman who was not sick with a communicable disease but merely lived next-door to somebody who was.71 The court justified its holding on the premise that "'[a]mong all the objects to be secured by governmental laws, none is more important than the
preservation of the public health," and statutes conferring such an important power should be construed liberally to ensure that the ends for
which the powers were granted be achieved.72
As late as the 1950s, courts continued to respect broad legislative
authority to quarantine based on a reasonableness standard. For example, in Moore v. Draper,73 the court denied a writ of habeas corpus
challenging involuntary confinement under a TB control act because
(1) laws and regulations regarding public health were a subject for the
legislature; (2) appropriate measures intended and calculated to accomplish these ends were not subject to judicial review; and (3) the
constitutional guarantees of life, liberty, and property do not limit the
police power of the state provided that the exercise of police power is
not arbitrary or unreasonable.74

3. Limitation on State Interest
During the 1960s and 1970s, the courts began to expand the scope
of constitutionally protected interests, 75 and as a result, more restrictions
67. IL at 25 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,203 (1824)).

68. Seeid.at27,38.
69. See supranote 49 and accompanying text.
70. For a general discussion tracing judicial decisions regarding past and present legislative
quarantine efforts, see Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doc-

trine, 14 HoFsTRAL. REv. 53 (1985).
71. See Crayton v. Larabee, 116 N.E. 355,356 (N.Y. 1917).

72.

I. at 358 (citations omitted).

73. 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
74. Rosemary G. Reilly, Combating the Tuberculosis Epidemic: The Legality of Coercive
Treatment Measures, 27 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 101, 113 (1993) (discussing Moore v.
Draper, 57 So. 2d 648, 649-50 (Fla. 1952)).
75. See Note, The ConstitutionalRights of AIDS Carriers,99 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1278-79
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were placed on the involuntary quarantine of individuals.76 For example,
in O'Connorv. Donaldson7 7 a patient was quarantined to a mental institution after a hearing before a county judge. The patient was held
against his will in the mental hospital for over fifteen years, despite repeated requests for release. In ruling that a finding of mental illness
alone could not justify involuntary confinement, the Supreme Court
78 ininterest.
liberty
patient's
the
of
importance
and
strength
the
dicated
During this period, the courts began to delineate the strict scrutiny
and intermediate scrutiny standards. Strict scrutiny applies when fundamental rights are burdened by legislation and "requires the state to
prove that the chosen action was the least restrictive alternative. 79 Intermediate scrutiny applies when quasi-suspect classes are involved or
when substantial, albeit not fundamental, rights are burdened by legislation."° Under this standard, a state must prove that the legislation furthers an important government objective through means which are substantially related to that end.8 Recall that where neither strict scrutiny
nor the intermediate standard applies, courts rely on the reasonableness
test, wherein the legislative regulation or statute is upheld unless it does
not further a legitimate state interest. 2
a. Washington State Tuberculosis Statutes
A present day example of the state police power to protect the
public health against disease is the recent revision of the Washington
State tuberculosis ("TB") laws which incorporated notions of due process and thereby limit the scope of the state police power.83 The laws

(1986).
76. See Reilly, supra note 74, at 117.
77. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
78. See id.
at 575-76.

79. See Note, supra note 75, at 1277 n.24 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343
(1972)); see also infra Part IV.B. (discussing the fundamental rights which trigger strict scrutiny,
focusing on privacy rights).
80. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender
classification); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a statute
which deprived individuals of driver's licenses).
81. See Craig,429 U.S. at 197.
82. See Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648, 650 (Fla.1952).
83. See Lisa A. Vincler & Deborah L. Gordon, LegislativeReform of Washington's Tuberculosis Law: The Tension Between Due Processand Protectingthe Public Health, 71 VASH. L. REv.

989, 1007 (1996). See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Resurgent TuberculosisEpidemic in the
Era ofAIDS: Reflections on Public Health, Law, and Society, 54 MD. L. REv. 1 (1995) (analyzing

the social foundations of TB as well as the powers and duties of state and individual responsibility).
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were reconsidered after medical and political assessments regarding the
development of new, multidrug resistant strains of TB and because of
the clinical relationship between TB and HIV.84 Due to the deterioration
of the public health infrastructure and the increased resistance to TB
treatment,"5 Washington reformulated its TB laws so that non-compliant
individuals can be requiredto submit to screenings in order to detect the
presence of the disease.86 In addition, physicians are required to report to
the name, sex, occupation, and residence of TB patients to the local
Board of Health8 The most significant change in the new law is the
implementation of due process standards which now offset the state's
police power." This juxtaposition of explicit due process protection for
the individual and the state's broad police power signifies a recognition,
in this instance, of the sanctity of an individual's fundamental right to
privacy, albeit one subordinate to the public health.89
b. HIV and AIDS
The advent of AIDS 0 and the rapid increase in the number of cases
of this incurable disease has caused great public concern about controlling the spread of the contagion. In the early 1980s, as the public gained
initial knowledge about the AIDS virus, legislative attempts to contain
the situation included "proposals for the massive screening of large
segments of the population and for the quarantining of all individuals
who tested positive for the antibody."'" Much of this legislative effort
clearly reflected misconceived public perception rather than scientific
proof regarding the communicability of the disease.9 Unlike TB, which
is spread through the air as a result of continued casual exposure, AIDS

84. See Vincler & Gordon, supra note 83, at 990-91.
85. See id. at 992.
86. See WASH. ADMN. CODE §§ 246-170-051, -055 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.28.031 (West 1992).
87. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 70.28.010.
88. See Vincler & Gordon, supra note 83, at 1007.
89. For a more detailed discussion of state police power and the control of TB, see George J.
Annas, Control of Tuberculosis-The Law & the Public's Health, 328 NEw ENG. J.MED. 585
(1993); Teri Flowers, Quarantiningthe Noncompliant TB Patient: Catching the "Red Snapper,"
28 L HEALTH & HosP. L. 95 (1995).
90. For a thorough description of the AIDS virus, see Rosencranz & Lavey, supra note 6, at
95-101.
91. Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of the Rationality of Mandatory Testingfor the HIV Antibody: Balancing the Governmental Public Health Interests with the Individual's Privacy Interest,

52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 327, 335-36 (1991).
92. For example, over 25% of Americans favor putting people with AIDS into quarantine.
See Note, supranote 75, at 1281.
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can only be transmitted by sexual contact or a mingling of body fluids."
Current testing programs now reflect accepted scientific principles
about AIDS, HIV, and its transmission. As a result, most screenings for
HIV and AIDS have been implemented on a voluntary nature due to
concerns such as confidentiality, stigmatization, and discrimination."
Due to these concerns, it is useful to determine whether a mandatory or
voluntary screening program best serves the state's purpose in controlling the spread of HIV and AIDS.
Professor Steven Eisenstat has provided the following guidelines in
assessing whether a voluntary or mandatory testing program is preferable in the context of HIV and AIDS: (1) What is the goal underlying
the testing scheme, and does the testing scheme help achieve that goal?
(2) Does the testing scheme provide a sufficiently reliable indication of
the IlV status of the subject? (3) Presuming that the testing scheme
serves a public health purpose, does it require the expenditure of funds
and resources which could be utilized in a more effective manner? (4)
Will the testing program discourage individuals who would otherwise
voluntarily seek HIV education and testing from doing so, due to their
fear of the nonconsensual disclosure of their test results to third parties?95 The following two sections explore the contrast between mandatory and voluntary HILV and AIDS screenings and identify when it is appropriate to use each method based on the availability of relevant
technologies.
i. Voluntary Testing
Professor Eisenstat's framework reveals that, generally, voluntary
testing is more appropriate with regard to the public at large when addressing the prevention and spread of AIDS. First, although the state
interest in protecting the public would be almost invariably satisfied,
there must be some nexus between the activities likely to spread AIDS
and the subjects of the testing.96 A mandatory screening en masse would
be irrational and invalid since the goal of the underlying testing scheme
could not be achieved by testing random subjects. A voluntary screening program, by contrast, would be rational as those individuals present93. See Eisenstat, supra note 91, at 336.
94. See infra Part I.A.3.b.i.
95. See Eisenstat, supra note 91, at 340 & n.78 (citing Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Case
Against Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS-Testing, Screening andReporting, 12 AM.
J.L. & MED. 7, 21-.24 (1987)).

96. See id at 341 (citing Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 686 F.
Supp. 243, 250 (D. Neb. 1988)).
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hig themselves for testing would do so only if they thought they had
been exposed to HIV or AIDS.
Second, voluntary testing presupposes the test subject's recognition
of the risk of exposure to the detrimental effects of the AIDS virus and
the importance of being tested. Therefore, a voluntary program would
provide a more reliable indication of the HIV status of a subject who is,
presumably, more wary of a possible false negative result of the
screening. Currently, tests for BIV and AIDS only screen for the antibody produced by the virus and do not identify the presence of the virus
itself.' Therefore, patients who are infected, but whose immune systems
have not yet begun to manufacture the necessary antibodies, will receive
a negative test result. Those patients who are voluntarily screened will
be more apt to interpret such a test result in light of their personal circumstances. Individuals who are mandated to receive testing may not
appreciate such a result, and relying on a premature negative test result,
may not take any precautions.
Third, as voluntary testing does not use more funds than will be
necessary to meet the demand of those who proactively seek the
screening, it is likely to be less expensive then mandatory testing. Alternatively, a mandatory screening procedure would require funds sufficient to encompass a much larger patient base, as well as potentially
provide for ancillary components of a testing program such as counseling and medications.9"
Finally, a voluntary program is less likely to discourage individuals
from undergoing screenings for fear of nonconsensual disclosure of
screening information. Mandatory testing goals usually rest on the need
to gather and then distribute the information regarding positive test results to persons other than those tested, including medical personnel,
health officials, and sometimes employers." In addition, a patient, although consenting to the release of information to the aforementioned
third parties, may feel insecure if there are no additional confidentiality
safeguards designed to protect the further dissemination of sensitive information beyond these parties.' ° Recent surveys indicate that "societal
biases" against AIDS victims "are clearly still operating"; ' consequently, many individuals potentially infected with HIV or AIDS may

97. Seeid. at331.
98. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
99. See Eisenstat, supranote 91, at 365-66.
100. See Ronald Bayer, AIDS and the Gay Community: Between the Specterand the Promise
of Medicine, 52 Soc. REs. 581, 600-01 (1985).
101. Eisenstat, supranote 91, at 366.
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actively attempt to avoid the testing rather than risk being discriminated
against when seeking employment, medical treatment, housing, and life
and health insurance.' °2 A voluntary testing program, with assurances of
confidentiality and a restricted use of information for the limited purpose of helping the patient, would quell some of these fears. A likely
result of voluntary patient participation is also patient behavior modification.13 "[1]t would appear to be somewhat unrealistic to rely upon
self-induced behavior change and notification by people who are being
tested against their will."'" Since a successful testing program would
rely upon the continued cooperation of its subjects, mandatory testing
could turn subjects away, thereby defeating the goals of the program.
ii. Mandatory Screening
There are certain circumstances under which mandatory testing has
been deemed constitutional by the courts. The examples below will illustrate that, generally, such circumstances include diminished privacy
expectations and conditions where transferability is more likely to occur.
Mandatory HIV testing for military employees seeking foreign assignment was upheld by a District Court for the District of Columbia. In
Local 1812, American Federationof Government Employees v. United
States Department of State,' 5 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the administration of mandatory screening-claiming that such screening was a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and therefore infringed on his personal privacy.' 6 The court
noted that the intrusion of the patient's bodily integrity was minimal as
the IRV test would be part of an overall health exam during which
blood was drawn for other purposes. Under these circumstances, the
individual had a diminished expectation of privacy. As such, the court
relied upon the rational relationship standard to sustain the regulation,
stating that the Department's purpose of ensuring that military person-

102. See id. It has been suggested that "'AIDS is the modem day equivalent of leprosy."'
Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987) (quoting South Fla.
Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)). See infra Part
I1.B.2. for a discussion of the discriminatory effects of medical testing.
103. See Eisenstat, supra note 91, at 341-42.
104. Id.
105. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
106. See id. at 53.
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nel going7 overseas were "fit for duty" was rationally related to the HIV
testing.1
New York's recent promulgation of a mandatory HIV screening
program for newborns 3 signals what may be an emerging trend in using
screening technologies to prevent the control and spread of diseases.
This statute makes New York the first state to implement a mandatory

IIV screening program for newboms.' 9 The new program " ° came as a
response to proven medical assessments which indicated that "steps before or at birth can reduce substantially the rate of AIDS transmission
One study found that "[a] regimen of ...
from mother to infant.'
the
mother during pregnancy and during labor
[AZT] administered to
and delivery, as well as to her infant during the first six weeks of life
significantly reduced the risk of maternal infant transmission of HIV

from 25.5% to

8.3%.,112

In order to pass constitutional challenges, the State of New York
must demonstrate that there is a legitimate state interest in the mandatory screening program and that no other less intrusive alternative
would achieve the intended goal(s)."3 The state goal for implementing
the mandatory screening is two-fold: (1) to reduce the spread of HIV
and inhibit the onset of AIDS to newborns through identification and
early treatment of HIV-positive infants; and (2) to educate HIV-positive
107. See id.
108. In June of 1996, New York State Governor Pataki signed the law which now enables
mothers to seek immediate treatment for newborns who test positive for HIV. See Monte R.
Young, Moms to Get Results of Baby AIDS Tests, NEWSDAY, June 27, 1996, at A40. The program
took effect on February 1, 1997. See Comprehensive Newborn IRV Screening Program, 19 N.Y.
St. Reg. 11, 11 (1997) (effective Feb. 1, 1997); see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2500-f
(McKinney Supp. 1997) (authorizing promulgation of the mandatory testing program).
109. See Deborah Sontag, H.LV. Testingfor Newborns Debated Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1997, at Al.
110. Regulations implementing and governing the comprehensive program are authorized
under N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f. See supra note 108.
111. Congress Addresses Newborn's HIV Tests, TIMES UNION (Albany), May 1, 1996, at A3.
The finding was considered so important that the study conducted on pregnant women, which revealed these results, was ended early so that those women whose babies tested positive could take
advantage of treatment options rather than remaining on placebos. See Linda Farber Post, Note,
Unblinded MandatoryHIV Screening of Newborns: Care or Coercion?, 16 CARDOzo L. REv. 169,
176 n.50 (1994). Some believe post-natal testing to be somewhat hopeless: the "'testing of newborns will not prevent the transmission of HIV to a single baby."' Deal Will Fund HIV Tests for
Pregnant Women, BUFFALO NEws, May 1, 1996, at A9 [hereinafter Deal Will Fund HIV Tests]
(quoting Sen. Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts).
112. Post, supra note 111, at 176 n.50 (quoting NATIONAL INST. OF ALLERGY AND INFEcnous DISEASES, CLINICAL ALERT, IMPORTANT THERAPEUTIC INFORMATION ON THE BENEFIT
OF ZIDOVUDINE FOR THE PREVENTION OF THE TRANSMISSION OF HIV FROM MOTHER TO INFANT

(1994)).
113.

Seeid at202.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:503

women both on the modification of high risk behaviors and on the
methods of coping with an IV infant. 114 Specifically, the purpose of the
modification to the Public Health Law's voluntary testing statute was to
"ensure that newborns who are exposed to HIV receive prompt and immediate care and treatment and counseling that can enhance, prolong
and possibly save their lives.""' Proponents of the new law praise its
role in saving the lives of newborns who are incapable of taking care of
themselves and who need protection in the event that the mother is unaware of her status or chooses not to pursue treatment for herself or for
her child.. 6 "'Given the recent advances made regarding the prevention
of HIV transmission from mother to child, it would be a tragedy if out
of ignorance, fear, or lack of health care, ' children
are born with a deadly
7
disease that could have been prevented.'
Opponents of the new law maintain that such mandatory testing offends the constitutional rights that shield individuals from unreasonable
search and seizure, as well as the right to privacy."' Most importantly,
opponents feel that the mandatory nature of the testing will result in the
opposite effect of its stated purposes" 9 because many of the women will
be frightened away from prenatal care due to the prospect of being
tested without their consent, especially if they are uneducated about the
risk of AIDS to themselves or their children.'" In addition, many
women want to avoid unnecessary stigmatization due to being labeled
as "diseased." Despite these concerns, ninety-three percent of the
women surveyed by the Health Department stated that they would have
voluntarily agreed to be tested and notified of the test results.''

114. See id. at 181. When infants test positive for HIV, the statute provides for the following:
post-test counseling (with the informed consent of the mother or person authorized by law to give
such consent); arrangements for health care, case management, and other related services; the
mother will be provided with referrals for health treatment of the mother and the infant; and strict
confidentiality of test results. See Comprehensive Newborn HIV Screening Program, 19 N.Y. St.
Reg. 11, 12 (1997).
115. Comprehensive Newborn HIV Screening Program, 19 N.Y. St. Reg. at 11; see also N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2500-f (McKinney Supp. 1997) (codifying same).
116. See Deal Will FundHIV Tests, supra note 111, at A9.
117. Id. (quoting Sen. Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, ranking Democrat on the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee).
118. See infra Part IV.B.
119. See Sontag, supra note 109, at B6.
120. See Young, supra note 108, atA40.
121. See Sontag, supra note 109, at B6.
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B. PrivacyInterests of the Individual
Any screening program that necessitates the taking of blood or resuits in the revelation of highly personal, sensitive medical information
implicates the privacy interests of the individual being tested. In the
context of medical screenings, the privacy of an individual can be implicated in two ways under the law: (1) unreasonable intrusion under the
Fourth Amendment and (2) infringement under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual from unreasonable
searches and seizures.'2 The Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California'2' decided that the constitutional concerns of mandatory testing
"plainly involve[] the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment."' 24 In the following year, the Supreme
Court developed a balancing test designed to assess the reasonableness
of the state's intrusion on an individual. In Camara v. Municipal
Court,'2 the Court first enunciated the need for this test stating that
"there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails."''M In that case, the Court considered whether probable cause existed for routine periodic inspections of property to ensure the minimum
standards under the local housing code when such inspections were not
the result of individualized suspicion. After balancing the concerns, the
court held that such inspections were a reasonable invasion necessary to
ensure those minimum standards, and as such, probable cause for a warrant existed in order to effectuate such searches of private property.' 7
Currently, the Court maintains the use of the balancing test and has
adapted it to better analyze varying degrees of privacy under different
circumstances. "Fourth Amendment interests are those interests that relate to an individual's expectations of privacy."' Diminished expecta122. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ......
Id.
123. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
124. Id. at 767.
125. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
126. Id. at 536-37. The Court also considered and applied the balancing test in the criminal
context. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
127. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-39.
128. Mark D. Johnson, HIV Testing of Health Care Workers: Conflict Between the Common
Law and the Centersfor Disease Control,42 AM. U. L. REv. 479, 494 n.73 (1993) (citing Mary-
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tions of privacy have been found in circumstances where the state has
demonstrated a "special need" to intrude on an individual's privacy in
order to ensure the public health or safety under the police powers.'29
a. Public Safety
Mandatory blood and urine testing has been constitutionally upheld, despite the absence of warrants and individualized suspicion, on
the grounds that it is reasonably related to furthering the state's interest
in protecting the public safety. 3 ° For example, in Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 31' railroad employees claimed that a regulation
requiring mandatory drug and alcohol testing was an unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Federal Railroad
Administration regulations
(i) requir[ed] drug and alcohol testing of blood and/or urine specimens
of employees involved in train accidents resulting in death, injury or
property damage in excess of $500,000; (ii) permit[ed] breath or urine
tests when a supervisor has a "reasonable suspicion" that an employee
contributed to a reportable accident or incident or when an employee
has violated certain rules; and (iii) permit[ed] breath tests based upon
personal observation giving rise to a "reasonable
suspicion" that the
32
employee is under the influence of alcohol.
The Court balanced the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy against the safety considerations inherent in the performance of
their jobs and held that although the test did constitute a search, it was
not unreasonable. 3 The Supreme Court upheld the regulations, ruling
that the government's substantial interest in safe rail transportation justified a departure from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements and, therefore, particularized suspicions were not necessary 4 As the Court noted, "the expectations of privacy of ...
employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry
land v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,333 (1990)).
129. Some commentators have characterized these searches as administrative in nature. See
id.
at 496.
130. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989)
(involving the testing of certain government employees); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) (involving breath and urine testing of railroad employees).
131. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
132. David A. Catheart, Drug and Alcohol Policiesand Testing Programs: A Review of Significant Issues, in EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS LAW FOR THE CORPORATE AND GENERAL
PRACrmONER 319,329 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. C588, 1991).
133. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627-31, 633.
134. See id. at 624.
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that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of... employees."'35

b. National Security
Protecting national security has been another justification for mandating a genetic screening program. The U.S. Customs Service, in National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab,136 required drug testing

of employees applying for or occupying positions involving drug interdiction, the carrying of firearms, or the handling of classified materials.'37 The Court held that the testing program, which did not require
reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol use, was a search under the
Fourth Amendment and therefore must meet the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirement.'38 After examining the interests of the state
under strict scrutiny, the Court held that the regulation was constitutional because the state interest in ensuring national security outweighed
the employees' diminished expectation of privacy."'
c. Public Health
Courts have relied upon the balancing approach outlined in cases
such as Skinner and Von Raab when analyzing the validity of intrusions
on the individual for the purpose of maintaining the public health. For
example, in Dunn v. White,'" the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
upheld mandatory testing of prisoners for the AIDS virus on the
135. Id. at 627; cf. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516, 1520 (D.N.J. 1986)
(holding that the mass screenings of the City's police and fire departments did violate the Fourth
Amendment because the City "had no general job-related basis for instituting this mass urinalysis,
much less any individual basis").
136. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
137. See id. at 660. The court did not consider the reasonableness of testing those who apply
for positions where they would handle classified material. See id. at 677.
138. See id. at 665.
139. See id. at 672, 679.
The Government's compelling interests in preventing the promotion of drug users to
positions where they might endanger the integrity of our Nation's borders or the life of
the citizenry outweigh the privacy interests of those who seek promotion to these positions, who enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of the special, and obvious, physical and ethical demands of those positions.
Id. at 679.
The Supreme Court has relied on similar reasoning to determine whether compulsory drug
testing in other circumstances is valid. Compare Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995) (upholding school policy for random drug testing of student athletes), with Chandler v.
Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997) (striking down requirement that candidates for state office pass a
drug test).
140. 880 F.2d 1188 (l0thCir. 1989).
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grounds that the intrusion on the prisoner's Fourth Amendment privacy
rights was reasonable under the circumstances. 141 There the court held
that prisoners have a lowered expectation of privacy, and that the
screening program was rationally related to the state's substantial inter-42
est in preventing the spread of AIDS among the prison community.
Also, the court noted in dicta that "the state's interest in public health
may even justify a similar intrusion on free world residents.' 43
In Karolis v. New Jersey Department of Corrections,'4 a New Jersey District Court relied, in part, on White in upholding a similar regulation requiring that prisoners be screened for TB. In Karolis, the plaintiff claimed that the testing violated his Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure and his First Amendment right of freedom of religion. 145 As a Christian
Scientist, the plaintiff opposed
'
"intrusive medical procedures."'
The court analyzed the prison policy under strict scrutiny because
fundamental rights of privacy were implicated. The court found that the
plaintiff had a lowered expectation of privacy due to his status as a prisoner, and that the state had a compelling interest in responding to the47
threat of any contagious disease by testing and treating prisoners.'
Additionally, it found that the state had an "affirmative duty" to protect
inmates from the spread of infectious disease and that to neglect this
duty would be a violation of the constitutional rights of other prisoners. The court concluded by holding that the TB test administered by
the prison was the
least restrictive means of furthering the state's com49
pelling interest.

141. See idUat 1196-97.
142. See id. at 1194-96.
143. Id at 1195.
144. 935 F. Supp. 523 (D.N.J. 1996).
145. See id. at 524-25.
146. Id. at 525.
147. See id. at 527.
148. See id.; cf. Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482-83 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding invalid a policy of mandatory TB testing because keeping noncompliant prisoners in "medical keeplock" was
not shown to be the least restrictive means to further the compelling state interest).
149. See Karolis, 935 F. Supp. at 528-29. The court stated that the TB test indicates dormant
TB while the next best alternative, a chest x-ray, will only show signs of active TB. See id. at 529.
"This distinction is critical. By the time an x-ray shows signs of TB, the infected individual may
have been spreading the disease to other inmates, whereas a positive [TB] test would trigger preventative therapy." Id. (citation omitted).
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2. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Privacy

A right to privacy, although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, has been generally recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right afforded citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment due
process provision.5 The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut...
relied on the Federal Constitution to find that specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights form "penumbras" and create certain "zones of privacy."'52 In so holding, the Court determined that a married couple has a

privacy right in their marital relations, and that a state law which criminalizes the use of contraceptive devices represents an unconstitutional

intrusion upon this right.'
This judicially created privacy right developed generally into two
forms: 1) the right of selective disclosure 54 and 2) the right of autonomy

in personal decision-making.

55

a. The Right to Selective Disclosure
The Supreme Court presented some of the basic principles supporting the right to selective disclosure in Whalen v. Roe. 5 6 In Whalen, a

New York statute required that the state be provided with a copy of
every prescription for "certain drugs for which there is both a lawful and
an unlawful market."'57 The statute was designed to "prevent unscrupulous pharmacists from repeatedly refilling prescriptions, to prevent us-

150. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 135 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). The following analysis
presumes the application of Fifth Amendment principles to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
151. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
152. See id. at 484.
153. See id. at485-86.
154. The right of selective disclosure is an individual's right in not having personal and sensitive information disclosed to others. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 617 (1989) (holding that an employer cannot disclose medical information beyond drug
abuse); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (noting individual's right to avoid
"disclosure of personal matters").
155. Autonomy is "personal liberty of action where the individual determines his or her own
course of action in accordance with a plan chosen by himself or herself... A person's autonomy
is his or her independence, self-reliance, and self-contained ability to decide." TOm L.
BEAuCHiAMp & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics 56 (1979); see also Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 750-51 (1989) (stating that privacy includes the "right to make choices and decisions").
156. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
157. Id. at 591. The drugs at issue in Whalen were classified as "Schedule II drugs" and included opium, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and methaqualone. See id. at 593 & n.8.
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ers from obtaining prescriptions from more than one doctor, or to prevent doctors from overprescribing."'' The plaintiffs argued that even if
confidentiality was ensured, the State failed to meet a necessity requirement since the information used in the databank was accessed only
two times during the first twenty months of the program's existence.'59
The Court recognized the right of a patient to avoid "disclosure of personal matters,"' ' but determined that the state's public health interest in
data collection was a reasonable exercise of its broad police power to
regulate the public health. The Supreme Court also found that the
State's failure to show a sufficient basis for the statute was insufficient
to deem the statute unconstitutional.'' Importantly, the Court noted the
necessity of affording the states broad police power to regulate the public health in order to encourage progress and guard against judicial
prejudices. Specifically, the Court recalled Justice Brandeis's statement:
To stay experimentation in things social and economical is a grave responsibility ....
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an
experiment ....But in the exercise of this high power, we must be
ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If
we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be

bold. 163
More recently, in Doe v. City of New York,' 6" the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that individuals have a
right to privacy regarding their HIV status.' 65 In Doe, the City of New
York Commission on Human Rights released the plaintiff's HIV status
in a press release detailing the resolution of a complaint that Doe filed
against a potential employer alleging discrimination based on the his
homosexuality and HIV-positive status. Plaintiff Doe claimed that release of such personal information was a violation of his right to privacy

158. Id. at 592.

159. See id.
at 595.
160. Id.at 599.

161. See id. at 598.
162. See id. at 597.
163. Id. (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
164. 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).

165. See id. at 267.
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and would likely lead to further discrimination
ond Circuit, in balancing the interests of Doe
Whalen, and concluded that the Constitution
right to privacy regarding the disclosure of
Compassionately, the Court of Appeals noted:

and ostracism. The Secand the State, relied on
protects an individual's
personal information. 66

Clearly, an individual's choice to inform others that she has contracted
what is at this point invariably and sadly a fatal, incurable disease is
one that she should normally be allowed to make for herself. This...
is especially true with regard to those infected with HIV or living with
AIDS, considering the unfortunately unfeeling attitude among many in
this society toward those coping with the disease.' 67
b. The Right of Autonomy in Personal Decision-Making
The Supreme Court recognizes an individual's right to make decisions free from undue governmental interference. Beginning with Griswold, the Supreme Court delineated a limited spectrum of privacy rights
included in the "penumbra" which are constitutionally protected. These
decisions generally include matters of contraception,"'8 marriage,169 procreation70 and education 171
Most relevant to the state's police power to regulate public health,
the Supreme Court began to recognize the importance of individual
health decisions free from government interference. For example, in
Roe v. Wade, a woman was found to have a limited right to choose
abortion free from government interference. 72 In Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, it was held that an individual has a
right to refuse medical treatment.' The Court premised its decisions on
the notion that "the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of
government."'"4 The Court also noted that in circumstances of personal
166. See id.The court noted that this right is more accurately "characterized as a right to
'confidentiality"' regarding the status of one's health. Id.

167. Id.
168. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,480 (1965).

169. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,2 (1967).
170. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973).
171. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 396-97 (1923).
172. SeeRoe, 410 U.S. at 117-18.
173. See 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990). However, the Court held that a state can require "clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's" desire to refuse medical treatment Ild.
at 286-87. Such
evidence was not available in Cruzan. See id&
174. Thomburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (Stevens,
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health and particularly death, "the ... challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding... liberty interests is entrusted to
the 'laboratory' of the States."'' 5 The right to autonomous decisionmaking, however, is limited by concern for the public as a whole, and
may be vulnerable to a compelling state interest-particularly in preserving human life.
Although previous cases such as Cruzan have established a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, the Supreme Court has distinguished acts such as physician-assisted suicide. In Washington v.
Glucksberg 76 and Vacco v. Quill,"7 the Supreme Court refused to find a
constitutional privacy right to physician-assisted suicide. The Court recognized the difficulty of determining whether a patient's privacy right
outweighed the state's interest in guarding against an involuntary hastening of death. After weighing the competing interests, the Court held
that the New York and Washington statutes banning physician-assisted
suicide were rationally related to a variety of government interests.
Those interests include protecting those individuals who are not truly
competent or those who are facing imminent death from making involuntary decisions to hasten death, as well as protecting the medical profession's integrity, and those vulnerable to abuse, neglect, mistake, or
social indifference.'
The right of autonomy in personal decision-making appears to be
unsettled, but Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, enunciated the
following description of the right: "Whatever the outer limits of the
[substantive sphere of liberty] may be, it definitely includes protection
for matters 'central to personal dignity and autonomy."" 9 This right,
according to O'Connor, also includes those decisions that will affect an
individual's, or his family's, destiny. 80

J., concurring).

175. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
176. 117 S. CL 2258 (1997).
177. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
178. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271-75.
179. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2307 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
180. See id (citation omitted).
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO
GENETIC SCREENING PROGRAMS

Competing individual and state interests must be examined in order
to determine whether the state should implement a genetic screening
program, as well as to establish the bounds of such a program. Although
genetic screenings have been used in the past,' the completion of the
Human Genome Project together with a growing understanding of genetic disease is likely to result in the implementation of genetic knowledge in our everyday lives." Genetic tests developed from this advancing technology is one way through which the benefits of genetic
discovery are reaching the public. "It is no exaggeration to aver that genetic testing will, over the course of the next two decades, revolutionize
medicine."'83 Genetic screenings will facilitate early detection of disease
so that steps can be taken to prevent the onset of the disease,'" or to reduce the amount of suffering associated with a disease for which there is
no current treatment. In addition, scientists will be able to use the
genome relational maps to build on existing technologies such as gene
therapy and to create new surgeries which will dissipate the effects of
genetic diseases. This new information and corresponding developments
in treatment technologies would arguably enable a state to find support
for implementing a mandatory genetic screening program under its police power."l The question then becomes at what point, if any, does the
state's interest in promoting the public health rise to the level of compelling such that individuals must submit to genetic screening for particular diseases.
Generally, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest in
protecting public health, safety, or morals when such protection will infringe on the fundamental rights afforded under the Constitution."6 Genetic testing would implicate fundamental privacy rights of selective
disclosure and autonomous decision-making,7 as well as the Fourth
181. See supra Part Ill.A.
182. See Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 20, at 758. The authors predict that not only will
"[g]enetic information ... transform the practice of medicine ... by every physician," but

"children will be raisedwith the intuition" that genetic information is essential to a healthy existence. Id. (emphasis added).
183. Reilly, supranote 57, at 1333.
184. See infra Part IV.B.2.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12 (discussing how the State of New York used
new medical assessments regarding the beneficial effects of early administration of AZT to newborns to support a compelling interest in mandating IV testing of pregnant mothers).
186. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
187. See supraPart III.B.2.
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Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.'88 Specifically, the government would need to show a compelling interest in the
goals of genetic screenings and that such screening statutes were narrowly drawn so as to be the least intrusive method of achieving the state
goals before such screening could be mandated."9
A. Compelling State Interest in Genetic Screening
In order to successfully implement a mandatory genetic screening
program, the state must demonstrate a compelling state interest in the
goals of the program.' 9 Such interest may rise to the level of compelling
if the state can support its rationale for the program with newly released
medical discoveries surrounding gene function and the location of genetic diseases on genes. The state's interest in mandating screening
would gain further support with the emergence and development of corresponding technologies which would enable physicians to reduce or
even eliminate genetic disease.
The following examples survey some of the more common state
rationales for instituting screening programs. These illustrate that in
most cases the state's interest does rise to the level of compelling; however, Professor Eisenstat's four-prong test, as applied to each scenario,
will illustrate that mandatory genetic testing may not be the least restrictive means of achieving the government's purpose. 9 '
1. Preventative Medicine
"The most likely objective of selective genetic screening is improvement inthe quality of life by identifying carriers and victims of
genetic disease."' ' This objective can be achieved in a variety of ways,
most prominently in prevention efforts.'93 The Human Genome Project's
188. See supraPart II.B.1.

189. See supra Part ]II.A.3. for a discussion of compelling state interest in regulation of publichealth. See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (holding that a
system which reserved positions for disadvantaged minority students was not the least intrusive
means of achieving the intended goals).
In reviewing a legislative provision that infringes on constitutional rights, judicial scrutiny
will focus not only on "the ends the state seeks to further but also, on ...the necessity of the
means which the state has used to achieve its ends." LAURENCE H. TRInE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-13, at 438 (2d ed. 1988).
190. See supraPart Ill.A.3.
191. Privacy interests of the individual will be addressed below. See infra Part IV.B.
192. Smith & Bums, supra note 4, at 38.
193. See C. Thomas Caskey, DNA-Based Medicine: Preventionand Therapy, in THE CODE OF
CODES: SCMNTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 5, at 112,
116-17.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/7

32

Raffone: The Human Genome Project: Genetic Screening and the Fundamental R
1997]

HUMAN GENOME PROJECT

maps will allow scientists to determine more precisely when an individual has or is predisposed to a disease before becoming symptomatic.' 94
"Foreknowledge of risk [of disease] presents the opportunity for close
' Thus, physimonitoring, early diagnosis, and curative interventions."195

cians can concentrate their talents on preventing the actual onset of disease, mitigating the severity of symptoms or preparing patients physi-

cally for the inevitable occurrence of disease.'96
For example, since the early 1960s, medical researchers have de-

signed and implemented screening of newborns thought to be at high
risk for phenylketonuria ("PKU"),97 a genetic disease which, if untreated, can lead to severe retardation. 9 Once the newborns were identified as having this disease, a simple dietary change was all that was
necessary for the infants to "mature into perfectly normal, healthy
adults." 9
In addition, genetic testing can also be used to screen for incurable

or deadly diseases, enabling one who is predisposed to a particular disease to ascertain the probability of its onset. This information is relevant
in family planning as well as personal well-being. To illustrate, if an
194. See les, supra note 36, at 30. "Once this integrated map is available, locations can be
established for ... disorders or predispositions for genetic disease." Id. Genetic tests can then be
developed from this information in order "to detect biological changes very early and allow anticipation of problems that may not be visibly expressed in overt symptoms for years." Dorothy Nelkin & Laurence Tancredi, Classify and Control: Genetic Information in the Schools, 17 AM. J.L.

& MED. 51, 57-58 (1991).
195. Reilly, supra note 57, at 1333.
196.

See, e.g., A.J. Dickerson, Generation of Cystic Fibrosis Sufferers Pin Hopes on Re-

search, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, at A28.
197. For an historical overview of early state mandated PKU testing from 1963 to 1969 and a
survey and citations of the state legislation where such testing was required, see REILLY, supra
note 56, at 43-61.
198.

See Kimberley Nobles, Birthright or Life Sentence: Controlling the Threat of Genetic

Testing, S. CAL. L. REv. 2081, 2084 (1992).
199. LEVINE & SUzUiK, supra note 9, at 232. PKU is a single gene defect; as such, the results
of genetic screening are highly determinative, producing results that can be analyzed quickly with
relatively less room for error. See id.
Currently genetic tests are available for a variety of other more complex conditions. See
Gordon Slovut, Genetics and Medicine; Genetic Testing Makes an Ounce of Prediction Worth a
Pound of Fear; Patients, Insurers, Doctors Question Who Should Be Told, STAR TRm., Oct. 25,

1995, at 1A. Genetic screening exists for some forms of leukemia, cancer, ataxia (inability to coordinate muscle activity), cystic fibrosis, fragile X (mental retardation), myotonic dystrophy
(progressive muscle weakness), hemophilia, Huntington's Disease, sickle cell anemia, and TaySachs. See id.

Scientists remain hopeful that they can develop screenings for the more common diseases
such as heart disease, colon cancer, lung cancer, and Alzheimer's. See generally Gina Kolata, If
Tests Hint Alzheimer's, Should a Patient Be Told?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at Al (discussing

genetic testing that reveals susceptibility to both heart disease and Alzheimer's).
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individual is diagnosed with an incurable disease before the onset of
debilitating symptoms, early detection through genetic screening gives
patients the opportunity to prepare mentally, physically, and financially
for future suffering.2 °°
Finally, various fiscal goals of the health care industry can be fur-

thered by using genetic screening for preventative purposes. For example, managed care organizations may rely on genetic screenings to keep
overall costs down.20 ' By screening members for genetic disease or the
predisposition for disease, managed care can begin to administer preventive care earlier to avoid the higher costs of treating advanced sickness and disease.2
The state interest in preventative medicine seems to satisfy the
compelling component of the balancing inquiry; however, application of
Professor Eisenstat's four-prong test will illustrate that there may be
some shortcomings inherent in such an interest. First, the goal of the
testing programs-early diagnosis of the onset or predisposition of genetic disease in order to engage in preventative care-will be met by
genetic screening only if the program also includes treatments for such
ailments. Diagnosing a genetic disorder which has no cure can frustrate
this purpose as people may react self-destructively.
Second, a successful testing program also assumes that the tests are
accurate in administration and results. Without accuracy, adverse consequences could easily occur because people will rely on false test results. For example, there is currently no evidence that screenings for
ovarian cancer are effective in reducing the number of deaths caused by

200. For example, after Louisa May Alcott was tested and found out that she had a high risk
of contracting Huntington's disease, she commented, "It was now a fact of my life that I had
Huntington's. How I choose to live from this point on is my choice .... I can readjust my wants
and priorities." Kimberly A. Quaid, A Few Words from a "Wise" Woman, in GENES AND HUMAN
SELF-KNOWLEDGE: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON MODERN GENEICS 3-17
(Robert F. Weir et al. eds., 1994).
201. Robert J. Pokorski, Use of Genetic Information by Private Insurers, in JUSTICE AND THE
HUMAN GENOME PRoJcr 91, 92 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lapp6 eds., 1994).
202. Lowering the costs of health care and allocating scarce medical interests are incentives
for the state to take action in implementing genetic screening. However, economic burden on the
state, while recognized as a legitimate state interest, does not, by itself raise the state's interest to
the level of compelling. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 567 (1996) (noting the state's
legitimate interest in offsetting the costs associated with indigent litigants); McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 50 (1990) (recognizing state's legitimate interest in sound fiscal planning).
It is important to note that although genetic screening may prove effective in managing
health care costs, the information gained through such screening can be misused by insurance underwriters to discriminate against certain genetically predisposed people. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.i.
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the disease.203 Women subjected to the test who receive unconfirmed
positive test results have often agreed to surgery exposing them to disabilities, infections, and other adverse health consequences. Of these
women, only a "tiny fraction" of those undergoing the surgery are found
to actually have the disease.204 The NIH concluded that these tests currently are ineffective as they lead to ambiguous results, and that the best
indicator of a woman's predisposition or presence of genetic ovarian
cancer is tracing family history and applying the appropriate probabili20

ties.

Suppose, however, that technology existed at a relatively low cost
which would reduce the onset of ovarian cancer or completely prevent
its occurrence. The state, in these circumstances, may have an interest in
mandating testing under its police powers for the purpose of protecting
the women at risk of developing this particular type of cancer. Yet this
argument is likely to be defeated by legislative and judicial precedent as
evidenced, for example, by the overturn of the mandatory SCA statutes, 24 mandatory HIV screening en masse,' and the judicial recognition of the right to refuse medical treatment.2
Third, presuming that the testing program furthers public health
goals, the next question is whether mandatory testing for preventative
medical purposes utilizes resources that could be more efficiently used
in another manner. This question assumes the accuracy of test results
and availability of treatments. A mandatory screening program provides
the opportunity for all patients at risk to acquire important information
about their own and perhaps their family's health. However beneficial
this purpose is, mandatory testing also carries with it a potential responsibility on the state to make available further resources to ancillary
components of testing such as treatments and counseling. Without these
services, those who cannot afford follow-up treatment after a positive
test result would be in the same position as those who test positive for a
disease for which there is no cure.
The state may also have to set aside funds to defend itself against
203. Current Ovarian Cancer Screenings Largely Ineffective, NIH Panel Concludes, BNA
HEALTH CAREDAILY (Wash.), Apr. 19, 1994, at D12.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. Although the SCA testing was once compelled, the Supreme Court held that the intrusion on fundamental rights outweighed the state's interest; the legislature responded by enacting a
voluntary SCA screening statute for adults. See supra Part I]f.A.1.
207. See supraPart llI.A.3.b.
208. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,270 (1990).
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foreseeable lawsuits arising from negligent testing or handling of results
or, in some cases, failure to test altogether. For example, in Blair v.

Hutzel Hospital,2 a woman who gave birth to a child with Down's
Syndrome sued the hospital for negligently failing to administer a pre-

natal exam that may have revealed the presence of the fetal congenital
disease. The plaintiff claimed that without this test and information, she
was denied the right to make an informed decision regarding her preg-

nancy; specifically, the plaintiff claimed that she was not given sufficient information to evaluate and exercise her options under Roe. The
Michigan Court of Appeals allowed her claim on the grounds that

Michigan recognizes wrongful birth, as well as recognizes abortion as a
viable option. 2 0 Blair illustrates judicial recognition of issues such as

accurate testing, disclosure of results, and liability of physicians. Although this case involved private parties, it is probable that the same

types of parameters will be used to form an action against a state in
similar circumstances. A strong dissent noted that state policy favors
life over abortion.211
Finally, seemingly neutral genetic profiles may also be used to jus-

tify siphoning costly medical resources to particular social groups. 212 For
instance, if a particular racial or ethnic group is considered to respond
better to certain treatments, efforts might be made by the government
and private companies such as health maintenance organizations to encourage legislative enactments making screening available only to those
likely to benefit from it and to discourage or make unavailable the same
treatment to others.1 3
209. 552 N.W.2d 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 569 N.W.2d 167 (Mich.
1997). While the course of action was held to be valid, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and
reinstated the trial court's summary judgment on the issue of causation. See Blair, 569 N.W.2d at
167.
210. See Blair,552 N.W.2d at 511.
211. See iL at 514 (O'Connell, J., dissenting). The "right to privacy 'implies no limitation on
the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.' ... [E]ven the
Roe Court acknowledged that the state has an 'important and legitimate interest.., in protecting
the potentiality of human life."' Id. at 515 (citations omitted).
212. See les, supra note 36, at47.
213. See id. at 47-48. Economic factors can also affect genetic testing; indeed, "[t]he ability
of people to obtain genetic tests and therapies is often influenced by their affluence and social
power." Id. at 48. As a result, testing may be developed according to consumer demand and ability
to pay, thereby disadvantaging racial or ethnic groups which cannot lobby for or afford such
treatment. See id. at 48.
Allocation of resources is just one example of how genetic information can perpetuate and
exaggerate the social, ethnic, and racial discrimination which is plaguing our society. Widespread
use and comparison of the genetic characteristics of the population can be manipulated by those in
power so that society's concept of a "desirable" set of traits reflects those of the empowered
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In summary, the resources that a state would need to commit to a
mandatory testing program based on preventative care would expand far
beyond the actual testing to other facets such as treatment, counseling

and legal defense funds. If a state, through mandatory screening, forces
people to face the difficult issues surrounding sickness or eventual

death, the state must also provide ancillary services in order to ensure
that the purpose of the testing is, in fact, achieved. As illustrated below,
a voluntary testing program would yield a more efficient use of resources.214

2. Inheritable Diseases
A state may also use genetic screening to lower the transfer rate of
25
inheritable diseases by identifying carriers of a disease. This technology is of vital importance to potential parents who may be carriers.
Specifically, these people are most concerned with the probability of
their children inheriting or being born carrying the disease trait. Genetic
test results can therefore be extremely informative in the family planning process;21 6 if a couple discovers that their offspring has a high
probability of inheriting the disease, the couple can take alternative
paths such as adoption, selective abortion, and contraception.27
Another alternative for carriers that will enable them to produce

classes. Such distinctions can work to justify discrimination against particular social groups so that
do they not have the same opportunity to receive medical services, education, and high paying
jobs. See UL at 27. The discrimination against African-Americans resulting from mandatory sickle
cell anemia screening is illustrative of this principle. See supra Part 1II.A.1.
214. See infra Part VI.
215. Genetic carriers are those persons that possess a gene for a particular disease but do not
manifest the physical traits of the disease. See Robert Wachbroit, Making the Grade: Testing for
Human Genetic Disorders,16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 587 (1988).
216. Screenings for Huntington's Disease exemplify the benefits of genetic testing by revealing early on whether or not this debilitating, and most often deadly, disease is present in the
genome. See Nancy Wexler, Clairvoyanceand Caution: Repercussionsfrom the Human Genome
Project, in THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL IssuEs IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 5, at 211, 235-36. The HD test is highly accurate in identifying who has the disease and the probability of contracting the disease in the future. One woman commented that before being tested she felt "damaged" and "emotional turmoil" about the possibility of not being a
"fully intact" human being. Quaid, supra note 200, at 13. After finding out that she had only a
three percent risk factor, she said, "IIM]y vision of what my life held in store changed for
me .... Now I feel that I can get and have anything I want... [including children]." Id. at 13-14.
"I fought to find out what my genetic material had to say and I am grateful." Id. at 14.
217. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming a woman's right
to abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (noting a woman's right to abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding married couple's right to use contraceptives); John
A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 697, 697, 711-15 (1990)
(discussing a woman's right to choose abortion).
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healthy children is to remove the diseased trait, if possible, from the fetus or child or to eradicate the disease trait completely though the use of
germ-line gene therapy before the child is even conceived. 28 This technology allows scientists to manipulate the disease-causing strands of

DNA which cause disease either by removing the genetic material that
causes the condition or by selecting for the cells that are healthy.2'9 Gene
therapy can also be applied to correct genetic defects in the lungs of

218. Gene therapy is a process by which defective or disease-causing genes are repaired or
eradicated. See LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 192-93. The two most common types of gene
therapy being researched and developed are somatic cell therapy and germ-line therapy. See id. at
217. Somatic cell therapy is a process that targets tissue cells affected by a genetic disorder; the
therapy is "transient" in that it only affects the tissue during the lifetime of the person on whom
the therapy was performed. See id.
A second, and more controversial type of therapy is now being explored for use in germline procedures (germ-line cells produce sperm or egg). During this type of procedure, a genetic
defect is isolated and removed or modified much in the same manner as somatic cell therapy, but
the repair is not confined to the lifetime of the individual on which therapy was performed. See id.
at 217-18. Rather, the new change becomes part of the permanent genetic composition of the person and will be passed on to all future generations. As one might imagine, there are a host of ethical problems surrounding this type of therapy in any organism, not just that of humans. See id. at
218; see also W. French Anderson, Human Gene Therapy: Scientific and Ethical Considerations,
in ETmICs, REPRODUCTION AND GENETIC CONTROL 147, 157-59 (Ruth F. Chadwick ed., rev. ed.

1992) (1987) (considering the ethical issue of engaging in germ-line therapy despite the potential
for perpetuating a "mistake" or "unanticipated result" in future generations).
This issue is especially poignant with knowledge that certain traits, once considered defective or undesirable, now are found to have a specific beneficial purposes. See infra Part IV.A.3.
Scientists declare that the goal of this type of embryonic alteration is both "humanitarian and economically sensible" because it "enabl[es] ... couples to conceive children while avoiding the
trauma and financial burden of lethal hereditary ailments." LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at
198. Not all scientists agree. Jeremy Rifkin, benefactor of the Foundation for Economic Trends,
noted the grave importance of taking the time to consider the long-term ramifications of such actions: "'Every decision by a scientist to edit millions of years of evolution is a eugenics decision
....

Perhaps none of us are wise enough, have the clairvoyance, the wisdom, to dictate basic

changes in millions of years of genetic evolution. I don't think any of us should have that power."'
Id. at 218-19.
The number of approved procedures for gene therapy is increasing. See Robin Herman,
Gene Therapy Is No Longer a Rarity, WASH. PosT, Jan. 21, 1992, (Health Magazine), at 7. Over
100 clinical gene-insertion protocols have been initiated as of 1997. See Transfusion Cellular
Gene Therapy Has Made Steady, Impressive Progress,GENE THERAPY WEEKLY, July 28, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7483471. The extent to which vie should use this technology is a question
that this generation will have to consider. Many controversies are likely to arise as more is learned
about the human genome and the functioning of DNA, but one thing is certain: with the increased
understanding of the human molecular structure as a result of the Human Genome Project, gene
therapy is likely to become an integral part of saving and improving lives, especially as the public
becomes more aware of this option.
219.

See generally Edward J. Larson, Human Gene Therapy and the Law: An Introduction to

the Literature,39 EMORY L.J. 855 (1990) (reviewing the development of the technology and the
ethical implications associated with its use). See also JEFF LYON & PETER GORNER, ALTERED
FATES: GENE THERAPY AND THE RETOOLING OF HUMAN LnE

49-50, 497-98 (1995).
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children suffering from cystic fibrosis, modify "an embryo's genome to
'enhance' normal characteristics, [or] to engineer[] wholesale changes
in the gene pool of the human race." The present goal of gene therapy,
however, is restricted to removing genetic disease from fetuses and reducing the suffering of those children who are born with genetic deficiencies.
The information produced by the Human Genome Project, combined with the use of genetic testing, will dramatically increase the efficacy of gene therapy. A state would clearly have an interest in using this
information to reduce, if not eradicate, certain inheritable diseases, thus
promoting the health (and economic contribution) of its citizens. This
would also serve to facilitate a more efficient allocation of the resources
previously dedicated to the diagnosis and treatment of such diseases.
However, unlike a genetic disease which can be treated with medication, the state's interest in reducing inheritable diseases, even if compelling, would probably not survive strict scrutiny because it directly
intrudes upon personal family decisions; such decisions include whether
or not to procreate, or alternatively, to modify or abort a fetus. 22' In addition, this testing program suffers from the same problems as those affecting a mandatory preventative care genetic screening program. 2
3. Genetic Diversity
Despite the attractiveness of eradicating inheritable disease through
gene therapy, some states may develop an interest in securing genetic
diversity. In human biological systems, "[t]he presence of mutant
[genes] in the population of a species forms the basis for Darwin's theory of natural selection." The presence of mutation, whether it causes
a positive or negative effect on its carrier, is essential for survival because it enables organisms to adapt to changing environmental conditions.' 4 This necessity may directly be at odds with gene therapy in that
scientists have yet to gain a full understanding of the importance of each
gene and the relationship of gene functions to one another in the human

220. LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 193.
221. See infraPart V.C. for a more thorough discussion of this issue.
222. See supra Part IV.A.1.
223. Norton, supra note 29, at 1591. "Many genes exist in alternative forms, or alleles, which
contain slightly different genetic information, or DNA sequences." Id. at 1590. In humans, the
simplest of inheritance patterns are genes with only two alleles; the dominant allele, which manifests itself when only one copy is present, and the recessive allele, which is exhibited only when it
present in two copies in an individual. See id. at 1590-91.
224. See id.
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body.2' Scientists are now discovering that some genes, once believed

to produce only negative effects, also contain positive traits without
which survival for some humans may have been made more difficult or
even impossible.

For example, SCA, which is found largely among the AfricanAmerican population, was thought to be a debilitating and undesirable
genetic defect.22l When the sickle cell gene was discovered, although the
technology existed to screen for carriers of the disease, science did not
have the technology to manipulate the gene.m Now, almost sixty years
later, scientists have found information revealing that the same gene
which causes SCA also allows those individuals who possess the trait to

be immune to malaria.'
Contrary to the state interest in mandating genetic screening so that
the occurrence of genetic disease can be reduced, the state may have a

compelling interest in preserving our human genetic diversity based not
only on scientific and evolutionary necessity, but social policy as well.
The state must consider whether current mutations are desirable enough
to be protected,2'0 or whether genetic tests should be used to screen for
and remove diseases to the extent that technology allows. This decision
will be based on societal values.2' It has been commented:
"Quality of life should be sought by the cautious improvement of our
cultural and environmental resource pools, and not by an impulsive
over-emphasis upon manipulations of a gene pool whose dynamics
and long-term mechanisms still allude us. We should improve the environment of our handicapped brethren, ... [and] seek means to cure

225. As described earlier, this is the very goal of the Human Genome Project. See supra Part
II.B. It is important to emphasize that even though the gene maps may be complete by 2005, these
maps are only one of the initial steps in understanding the full complement of gene relationships to
one another and their aggregate effect on the human body. A deeper and full understanding of genetics, despite recent advances, is still in a nascent stage. The Human Genome Project is the key
that scientists hope will unlock the door to new discovery and progress.
226. See LEvwn & SuzuI, supra note 9, at 38; Norton, supra note 29, at 1591-92.
227. See REILLY, supra note 56, at 67-72.
228. See id. at 67. For a discussion of SCA testing, see supra Part IIM.A.1.
229. See LEVINE & SUZUKi, supra note 9, at 40. It is important to note that "[i]n the case of
sickle cell anemia, a change in environmental conditions has made the positive effects of [the mutant gene] less beneficial.... The benefits and drawbacks of genetic 'defects' must therefore be
analyzed in the context of specific environmental conditions." See Norton, supra note 29, at 1592.
230. See infra note 253 for a discussion of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
231. This proposition begs the question of whether the state should evaluate the quality of an
individual's life, when that person's life is burdened by disease, sickness or handicap, or long- or
short-lived.
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phenotypic anomalies instead of alleviating their owners." Z2
This interest would best be implemented through a voluntary program whereby potential parents may, if they choose, receive genetic
screening that would enable them to make informed decisions regarding
procreation. In this way, the state would free itself from obligatory
treatments attendant to mandatory screening which may have dramatic
effects on the future life of the fetus.
4. State Interest in Potential Life
If the state has the resources and the technology available to screen
for and cure particular genetic diseases at a reasonable or low cost, the
state may claim that it has a compelling interest to mandate the genetic
screening of potential parents, fetuses, or newborns in order to preserve
or assure their health. With increased medical knowledge, the state may
try to secure protection for potential life at its earliest stages; the applicability of the standard of viability would then be at issue. The state
would justify its need to interfere at these early stages so that effective
cell manipulation could occur, thereby eradicating the disease in question.
In such a scenario the state would likely claim that it was protecting potential life. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court explained the
historical significance of prior statutes prohibiting abortion and recognized that as long as potential life is involved, the state may assert interests beyond those of the pregnant woman.23 The Court went on to say
that "the State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, ... and that it has
still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life."' The Court then set up a trimester framework as a
continuum on which the state's interest is deemed to become compelling at the stage of viability, which occurs in the third trimester.7 5
The Supreme Court in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey rejected the
232. Smith & Bums, supra note 4, at 41 (quoting Paul R. Gastonguay, Human Genetics: A
Model of Responsibility, 4 ETHICS INSCl. & MED. 119, 132 (1977)).
233. 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
234. Id.
235. See id.at 163-64. But see Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition That
"Life Begins at Conception," 43 STAN. L. REv. 599 (1991). As Professor Rubenfeld noted:
Viability never made sense as the point at which the state interest in potential human
life becomes compelling. Its appeal lies in its demarcation of a stage at which the fetus,
having become "capable of meaningful life outside the mother's womb," may be regarded as a distinct life-in-being with interests of its own-as, in short, a person.
Id. at 635.
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trimester approach developed in Roe v. Wade because, among other
shortcomings, this approach "in practice ... undervalues the State's interest in potential life. ' ,2 6 Evaluating the Pennsylvania statute at issue
under the undue burden test, the Court reaffirmed a recognition of the
State's legitimate interest in the life of the fetus. The Court stated that
the undue burden test was more appropriate in order to balance "the
State's profound interest in potential life" against the privacy rights of
the pregnant woman.2 7
B. Implications of Genetic Screening on PrivacyInterests
1. Potential Intrusions on Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests
As previously discussed, intrusions on an individual's privacy right
for the purpose of medical screening has been allowed in limited circumstances characterized as special need or administrative searches.2t
Under these circumstances, individuals have a lowered expectation of
privacy.
In the context of genetic screening of the public, 2 9 there is generally no lowered expectation of privacy. In addition, unlike TB or AIDS,
a genetic disorder is not highly contagious and can only be communicated through reproduction.24 Finally, unless the state is prepared to
formally declare that a genetic disease renders an individual unfit for
certain public employment tasks related to the public safety or welfare,
there is no special need to conduct the testing. For example, unlike the
railroad employees in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, a
predisposition for genetic disease generally does not incapacitate an individual to the extent that the public safety would be jeopardized.24 ' But
note, as some genetic diseases are being held akin to disabilities,4 2 this
argument may gain strength.

236. 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992).
237. Id. at 878. In this context, the statute was held invalid because it worked a substantial
burden on the ability of a woman to seek an abortion before viability. See id.
238. See supraPart I1.B.1.
239. For ease of discussion, "public" will refer to those segments of the population who are
deemed to be at an above average risk for the particular genetic disease being discussed (for example, ovarian cancer).
240. See infra Part IV.B.2.b. for a discussion about intrusions by the state on reproductive
decision-making.
241. See supraPart fII.B.l.a.
242. See infra note 253 for a discussion of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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2. Fundamental Privacy Right Under the Fourteenth Amendment
in the Context of Genetic Screening
a. Selective Disclosure and Discriminatory Effects of
Genetic Information
Regarding genetic screening, privacy includes "the right of persons

to make an informed, independent judgment about whether they wish to
be tested and then whether they wish to know the details of the outcome
' Much like the homosexual HIV-positive plaintiff in
of the testing."' 43
Doe v. City of New York,24 an individual being tested for a genetic disorder would have an interest in not having such personal information

disseminated without consent, particularly because of a fear of discrimination.
Already there is marked concern about potential employment and
insurance discrimination against individuals who have undergone genetic screening and who have tested positive for a predisposition to or
actual presence of genetic disease.2" Such potential discrimination could
discourage individuals who would otherwise voluntarily seek testing.
As Professor Eisenstat has illustrated,246 this reaction could frustrate the
purpose of an otherwise valid screening program.
i. Insurance Discrimination
There has already been much debate about potential discrimination
against those individuals deemed genetically deficient, especially with
regard to the availability of affordable health insurance.24 7 Agencies will
243. INSTrrUT OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND
SocIAL PoLcY 248 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
244. See supra Part Ill.B.2.
245. Genetic discrimination is defined as "discrimination against an individual or against
members of that individual's family solely because of real or perceived differences from the
'normal' genome in the genetic constitution of that individual." Marvin R. Natowicz et al., Genetic
Discriminationand the Law, 50 AM. J. HuM. GENETcs 465, 466 (1992).
People at risk for genetic discrimination are (1) those ...who are asymptomatic but
carry a gene(s) that increases the probability that they will develop some disease,
(2) individuals who are heterozygotes (carriers) for some recessive or X-linked genetic
condition but who are and will remain asymptomatic, (3) individuals who have one or
more genetic polymorphisms that are not known to cause any medical condition, and
(4) immediate relatives of individuals with known or presumed genetic conditions.
Id. at 466.
246. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
247. See Paul R. Billings et al., Discriminationas a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM.
J. HuM. GENETICS 476, 479 (1992); Richard A. Bornstein, Genetic Discrimination,Insurability
and Legislation:A Closing of the Legal Loopholes, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 551, 551-52 (1996); Natowicz
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contribute to the creation of an underclass of genetically unfavorable
individuals by seeking out member populations made up of only the
"genetically superior" individuals. Those with weak genetic makeups or
profiles exhibiting undesirable traits will be denied insurance coverage
or be forced to pay higher premiums. 28 For example, one health insur-

ance company has already attempted to deny coverage of a child born
retarded when prenatal testing revealed a very high probability of a
"defective" fetus and the mother refused to abort. 49
Breast cancer screening provides an example of the public concern
regarding confidentiality of genetic information and the potential for
discriminatory abuse. General population screenings are currently available for a particular type of genetic defect which causes breast cancer.2

Many women, however, feel uneasy about having positive results recorded in their medical records due to fears of insurance or workplace
discrimination.25 ' As a result, awkward and somewhat burdensome
measures have been taken to ensure the confidentiality of test results.
Thus, some tests are performed under the aegis of research programs
that allow doctors to keep the information confidential by encoding results; some doctors advise their patients not to disclose the information
to their private practitioner if that doctor has a policy of recording all
medical information in the records; and some women have used aliases
when testing at sites which do not have the secrecy protections of the
research program privilege.2 2 "'If we ever needed proof that the system
is broken, this is it..... The system forces people to take drastic steps
to protect themselves. It is putting a terrible burden on patients."' 3

et al., supra note 245, at 467.
248. See Kyle G. French, Note The Elderly and the Discriminatory Use of Genetic Information, 5 ELDER L.L 147, 164-65 (1997); see also Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 43, at 334.
249. See Larry Thompson, The Price of Knowledge: Genetic Tests That Predict Dire Conditions Become a Two-Edged Sword, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1989, (Health Magazine), at 7.
250. Biologists have recently discovered a genetic defect in the gene known as BRCA1 which
causes breast cancer. See Gina Kolata, Breaking Ranks, Lab Offers Test to Assess Risk of Breast
Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al. Some doctors have made genetic screening available for
women who are healthy presently but who may be at a high risk for developing the cancer at a
future date. See id. Recent studies, however, indicate that BRCA1 testing is inadvisable at this
time due to inaccurate and ambiguous results. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
251. See Gina Kolata, Advent of Testing for Breast Cancer Genes Leads to Fears of Disclosure and Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at Cl.
252. See id.
253. ld.(quoting Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the National Center for Human Genome
Research). The legislature has reacted to these privacy concerns in both the workplace and insurance arenas. For example, protection against discrimination in the workplace is found in a new
modification to the Americans with Disabilities Act which now potentially classifies genetic deficiency as a disability against which employers and insurers cannot discriminate. See 42 U.S.C.
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ii. Employment Discrimination
In the workplace, discrimination will take the form of deprivation
of equal employment opportunities if employers are allowed to adopt
genetic testing as part of the employment application process." "[F]rom
an employer's point of view. .. a person [with a disease or even a carrying the gene] could conceivably pose a financial risk in training, work-

§ 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994); Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based
Diagnostic and Prognostic Test by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 122-23
(1991); Judith Richter, Taking the Worker as You Find Him, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
189, 223-31 (1997); cf. Joseph S. Alper, Does the ADA Provide ProtectionAgainst Discrimination
on the Basis of Genotype?, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 167, 168-71 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, The
Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination:Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV.
1, 13 (1994). In addition, the Act provides protection for those who carry a disease as identified
through a genetic screening. These individuals may not be discriminated against simply because
they may not be qualified for the job position at a future date, nor can they be discriminated
against because their children have a high risk of incurring expensive medical costs for the employer. With regard to insurance, many fear that genetic testing will result in higher premiums or
loss of insurance coverage due to tests results which reveal a propensity for illness of the individual or the individual's child. See Bomstein, supra note 247, at 551-53.
Currently, twenty-five states have enacted legislation to protect individuals against discrimination in the workplace or in acquiring insurance based on genetic information. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-448, -448.01 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1463 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); CAL. CtV. CODE § 56.17 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 1374.7 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 742.405, 10123.3, 10140.1,
10146.49 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West Supp. 1997);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.4301, 760.40 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-54-1 to
-8 (1996); 410 ILL. COmp. STAT. ANN. 513/20, 513/25 (West 1997); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/356t (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West 1997)]; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 33-18-206 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 629.111-171, 689A.417, 689B.069, 689C.198,
695B.317, 695C.207 (Michie Supp. 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-11:1-6 (1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-43 to -49 (West 1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 1713:30-12 (West 1985 & Supp.
1996); N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993); N.Y. INs. LAw § 2612 (McKinney Supp. 1998);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-3-215, 95-28.1A (1998); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3901.49, .491, .50,
.501 (Anderson 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1742.43, 1751.64-.65 (Anderson 1997); OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 659.227, .700, .705, .710, .715, .720, 746.135 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-6.7-1
to -4 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-7-2702 to -2703 (1998); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.401.402, .404-A05 (vest Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4 (Michie Supp. 1997); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 111.372, .375, 639.89 (West 1997); 1997 Ala. Acts 97-721; Ark. H.B. 2011, 81st
Reg. Sess. (1997); 1997 Conn. Legis. Serv. 97-95 (West); 1997 N.Y. Laws ch. 45; 1997 Or. Laws
ch. 778.
254. "Employment discrimination includes unfavorable treatment in hiring, promotion, assignment of duties, discharge, compensation, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Natowicz et al., supra note 245, at 467. Indeed, "genetic tests ultimately will be developed to identify workers with the predisposition toward... diseases." Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra
note 43, at 334 n.124 (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH ASSESSMENT, GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE 10-12 (1990)); see also Katherine Brokaw, Note,
Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employer's Liability, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
317, 326 (1990) (discussing the potential use of genetic screening tests to limit job opportunities
for workers and the attendant liability of employers).
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men's compensation and insurance premiums, and so forth." ' Thus,
subsequent to genetic screening, an individual, although asymptomatic
for sickness, may be passed over in favor of another individual whose
genome results reveal that he or she is free from certain genetic diseases
or has a lower probability of developing other types of illnesses. Institutions will then effectively be able to create a genetic norm by which
individuals will be measured2 6 It is probable that unless some protection is afforded genetic information, one's scientifically based genetic
profile will be more persuasive in an interview than the individual's
outward appearances, personality, or even job qualifications.
b. Autonomous Decision-Making Based on Genetic
Information
As Supreme Court precedent illustrates, an individual has a limited
right to make important health decisions free from undue governmental
interference.f 7 This type of privacy in the context of genetic testing and
screening refers to the "right of the individual to control his or her destiny, with or without reliance on genetic information, and to avoid interference by others with important life decisions.""5 Mandatory genetic
testing would strip this choice away from the individual regardless of
whether the testing was for the purpose of preventative care or reducing
the occurrence of inheritable diseases.f 9
In summary, if the state considers mandating genetic testing,
thereby depriving an individual of selecting the persons to whom their
genetic information will be revealed, there must be sufficient confidentiality protections attached to the results of the testing, so that those who
test positive do not suffer from discrimination in the workplace or in
procuring and maintaining health insurance. 6'

255. Smith, supra note 11, at 887.

256. As some commentators note, "In our society, we call upon nature by using biological
tests to assure that individuals conform to institutional values. The power to define what is normal
can impose standards of conformity, while the ability to measure individual deviations can justify
classifications and hierarchy." Nelkin & Tancredi, supra note 194, at 58.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 168-80.
258. INsTrrtEoFMDicNE, supra note 243, at 248.
259. Reasons why an individual may choose not to be exposed to a genetic screening include
"[tihe lack of effective treatment" and "anxiety over the testing itself," as well as an "inability to
undo the knowledge." Bornstein, supra note 247, at 573. "Asked whether they would take a genetic test that could tell them what diseases they were likely to suffer in life, nearly as many people said they would prefer to remain ignorant (49%) as said they would like to know (50%)."
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Genetic Revolution, TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 46, 48.
260. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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i. Early Diagnosis of Treatable Genetic Diseases
As discussed earlier, the purpose of preventative care would be
frustrated if, after a person underwent screening, no cure or treatment
was available. 6' Genetic diseases are generally immutable, 62 and once a
disease marker is found on a gene, the release of the results to an individual may imply that there is a treatment or a cure available. 63 Genetic
screening which reveals the presence of genetic markers for disease and
behavioral disorders does not facilitate simultaneous discovery of the
cures and treatments necessary to ease or remove the suffering associated with these conditions. 26' Releasing such information to those who
cannot be cured may cause physiological harm such as depression' or
have a stigmatizing effect on individuals within their communities.
Thus, removing the freedom of a person to decide whether to submit to
such testing and to be informed of the results of the testing unduly infringes on an individual's right to make autonomous decisions regarding
his own or his family's destiny.
ii. Inheritable Diseases
The state's interest in reducing the occurrence of inheritable diseases unduly intrudes on an individual's autonomous decision-making
because this interest directly affects family planning. As stated earlier,
inheritable genetic diseases are transmitted only through reproduction
and in this way are distinguished from highly communicable diseases
such as HIV and AIDS.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly afforded the state broad police
power when legislation was aimed at controlling the spread of deadly or
debilitating diseases. 266 The Court's sentiment that "a community has the
right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the
261. See supraPart IV.A.1.
262. An immutable gene is not susceptible to change. If the technology does not exist to remove the disease-causing piece of the gene or if scientists have not mapped the location of the
disease, screening will merely inform the afflicted individual of the presence of the disease trait,
leading the individual to face the knowledge that he or she will inevitably suffer and perhaps die
from the presence of the gene.
263. See Smith, supra note 2, at 127.
264. See Brock, supranote 28, at 20.

265. See Bornstein, supra note 247, at 575 n.94 (discussing how some individuals experience
suicidal thoughts or actually commit suicide after genetic screening results indicated the presence
of a disease trait). Even carriers, those that simply carry the disease in their genetic makeup but do
not suffer from it, "often experience confusion, alienation and depression after being tested." Id. at

575.
266. See supra Part m.A.2.
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pervades modem legal thought as part of

the underlying rationale for instituting medical screening such as HIV
tests.' However, genetic diseases are distinguishable from communicable diseases that the Supreme Court has dealt with in the past because

the transmission of such diseases occurs through reproductive methods' and, therefore, do not classify as highly communicable. This factor would tend to diminish the substantiality of the state's interest; yet,

the state may claim that it does have the authority to mandate testing in
circumstances where an accurate testing device is available to detect
genetic diseases
or disorders for which there are accessible treatments
27
or cures.

0

For example, breast cancer tests currently screen for gene mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Early detection allows women to
seek treatment before symptoms appear and before mutations show on a
mammogram test. Although some women will be able to prevent the
onset of cancer through available treatments, some will not. Currently,
there is no cure or guaranteed prevention.27

iii. Fetal Genetics
If there is no cure or treatment for the individual being tested, then
the state's interest will focus on preventing inheritability of disease by
addressing the health of the fetus. The focus of the analysis would then
shift to the question of whether the direct risk to fetuses would raise the
state interest to the level of compelling such that the state could mandate genetic testing on pregnant women.272
Similar to HIV screening, before a state may intrude on the

267. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
268. See supra Part IIL.A.3.b.
269. Reproduction includes various methods of conception including coital reproduction, in
vitro fertilization, and artificial insemination.
270. Cost would be an important factor in order to assure that all individuals subjected to a
mandatory screening program would have access to the benefits of testing. If an individual is
tested and cannot afford the cure, what is the legislative purpose in collecting the results of genetic
testing and forcing those tested to know of their genetic status? In this scenario, the state interest
would seem to fall short of compelling.
271. In addition to the lack of available guaranteed cure, some medical commentators have
suggested that widespread use of this genetic test is inadvisable because the results are still ambiguous. "Many women with a negative test will still develop breast cancer, and some with a positive test will not... BRAC 1 screening test should thus not be recommended as a population
screening test... at this time." Heather Bryant, Genetic Screeningfor Breast Cancerin Ashkenazi
Women, LANCEr, June 15, 1996, at 1638, 1638.
272. The Supreme Court has cautioned that privacy is not to be taken as an unlimited right to
do with one's body as one wishes. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/7

48

Raffone: The Human Genome Project: Genetic Screening and the Fundamental R
1997]

HUMAN GENOME PROJECT

autonomous decisions regarding procreation, a state needs to couch its
interest in medical evidence showing that, once genetic disease is detected in the pregnant woman and fetus, treatment would significantly
reduce the suffering associated with the disease or prevent the occurrence of the disease in the genome of the fetus. In the case of the New
York HIV statute, the state's interests in reducing the spread of HIV to
newborns and to render efficient and effective treatment thereby reducing the occurrence of AIDS in newborns justifies the intrusion into the
privacy rights of the mother.273
Finally, it is probable that whether the mother, the fetus, or the
newborn is tested for genetic disorders, the same concerns arise with regard to confidentiality and discrimination.274 Such fears could potentially disuade those patients in need of care from undergoing necessary
screening, especially if the patient already suffers from discrimination.
In considering whether genetic screenings should be mandatory or
voluntary, the state's interest in potential life must be balanced against
the right to privacy and the freedom to make reproductive decisions free
from unreasonable state interference. The Supreme Court first alluded
2 5 where Justice
to this decision-making right in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
Brennan remarked that the individual has a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion" in making "the decision whether to
bear or beget a child. 276 In that case, the Court relied on Griswold v.
Connecticut, which was the first time that the Supreme Court recognized a right to privacy in making personal decisions, specifically, the
decision to use contraceptives for purposes of family planning.2 7 The
Court in Roe expanded this concept. While recognizing a state interest
in potential life, the Court focused on the right of the pregnant woman
to decide whether to carry to term or abort the fetus.278 Casey reaffirmed

273. See supra Part III.A.3.b. The mother's privacy rights are infringed upon directly, as the
choice whether to test her baby for IV has been stripped away from her, as well as indirectly, for

in testing the child, the hospital draws blood from the mother, thereby testing her for HIV by
proxy. See Post, supra note 111, at 212.
274. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
275. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
276. Id. at 453.
277. 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965) (holding a statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to married persons unconstitutional). But see Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protectionof
Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. Cr. REV. 173. Posner believes that Baird addressed
merely the distribution, not the use, of contraceptives, and as such the Court's opinion is "a pure
essay in substantive due process. It unmasks Griswold as based on the idea of sexual liberty rather
than privacy." Id. at 198.
278. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). The Roe Court stated that the right to
privacy includes a limited right to terminate a pregnancy, and that a state may intervene when the
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the essential holding in Roe by recognizing the right of a woman to

choose to have an abortion before viability without undue interference
from the state. 279

Whether or not the autonomous nature of personal decision-making
will erode due to future advancements in genetic technology remains an

open issue. Specifically, as the Human Genome Project reveals more
information about genes and spurs new technology which can save or
improve the potential life of a fetus, the question is raised whether a
pregnant woman who tested positive for a particular disease through a
mandatory testing program will be able to assert her privacy rights in

order to choose not to accept treatment for herself and/or the potential
life inside of her?' The Court in Roe recognized the slippery slope on
which the state police powers would rest if states were allowed to interfere in such personal matters. In dicta, Casey reiterated this concern by
stating:
If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear and beget a
child had not been recognized as in Roe, the State might as readily restrict a woman's right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to
terminate it, to further asserted state interests in population control, or
eugenics, for example.2'
The Court may have relied on the doctrine of informed consent to
support this notion. 2 This principle includes the right to refuse medical
intervention, even if such refusal results in the patient's own death, as
state's interest rises to the level of compelling. See id. The Court further noted that fetal viability
marks the threshold for state interference, at which point, the state may choose to ban nontherapeutic abortions. See id.
279. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). The Court also summarized
the established rights relating to personal decision-making as precedential support for its decision.
"Our law affords constitutional protection for personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education." Id. at 851.
280. For example, a woman may choose to carry a fetus to term despite the knowledge that
the child may suffer from a disease or disorder. Personal religious and moral beliefs shape this
type of decision and must be considered in a mandatory testing program.
281. Casey, 505 U.S. at 859.
282. Informed consent requires that a physician obtain the consent of a patient before administering treatment or performing an operation.
Informed consent refers to legal rules that prescribe behaviors for physicians in their
interactions with patients and provide for penalties, under given circumstances, if physicians deviate from those expectations; to an ethical doctrine, rooted in our society's
cherished value of autonomy, that insures to patients their right of self-determination
when medical decisions need to be made; and to an interpersonal process whereby
physicians ... interact with patients to select an appropriate course of medical care.
PAUL S. APPELBAUM Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CINICAL PRACTICE 3
(1987).
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3
There, the Court explained that "[i]t cannot be
discussed in Cruzan.m
disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in' 4life as well
as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment."
Contrasting the Court's recognition of the privacy implications in
refusing medical treatment, the state has an interest in promoting potential life by regulating abortions. 5 The state, therefore, can enact statutes
or regulations which, in effect, promote childbirth as long as these provisions do not impose an undue burden on the woman in choosing one
alternative over another2 6 "But courts must be careful not to allow a
state to disguise what is actually a coercive rule as a rule merely encouraging [women to be] responsib[le]" for knowing the health risks
and the psychological and moral implications of her decision.2 r

V. BALANCING STATE INTERESTS AND INDIVIDUAL
PRIVACY CONCERNS

Regardless of whether the state has a compelling or substantial interest in genetic testing, mandatory genetic testing necessarily interferes
with the fundamental liberty interest in privacy. As discussed, such an
intrusion triggers strict scrutiny; as a result, the question remains
whether mandatory screening is the least intrusive method of achieving
the state's goal of protecting the public health.2 s
A.

Cures or Treatments

Although genetic tests can be developed to diagnose several different diseases,2 9 a cure or treatment for many of these ailments does not
exist.2 0 As such, the current rationale for mandatory genetic screening
parallels that of the mandatory HV testing, namely protection of the
283. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,261 (1990).
284. Id.at 281. When addressing the right to refuse medical intervention, courts have considered four countervailing interests: the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection
of innocent third parties, and the maintenance of the integrity of the medical profession. See Thor
v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1993) (in bank); see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-80
(noting the need to balance countervalling interests of individuals and the state).
285. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (balancing the states' interest
in protecting potential life against a woman's autonomy in personal decision-making).
see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 896.
286. See id.;
287. RONALD DwoRxsN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
AND INDIVIDuAL FREEDOM 153 (1993).
288. See supra Part IV.
289. See supra Part V.B.2.b.i.
290. See Brock, supra note 28, at 20; see also Part V.B.2.b.i. (discussing treatability of various genetic disorders).
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fetus or infant. 291 Genetic tests are used to detect carriers of genetic disorders and provide prenatal diagnosis to determine the presence of an
inheritable disease. 2 2 However, just as New York could not mandate
HIV newborn screenings without a medical assessment of the effectiveness of early medical treatment, mandatory genetic testing cannot be
implemented for any disease without medical assessment of potential
cures.
The absence of available cures and treatments clearly frustrates the
purpose of genetic screening. Thus, the purported goals of the program-the protection of public health through preventative care, reducing the occurrence of inheritable diseases, or as in the case of potential
life, isolating the presence of genetic disease or predisposition-are insufficient, in themselves, to justify the state's intrusion on an individual's right to privacy.
B. Identifiable Patients
Similar to the examples of screenings presented above, medical
screening generally requires that those being tested are part of an identifiable group likely to be carrying or infected with a particular disease. 293 Exceptions to this requirement are individuals who are part of a
group with a lower expectation of privacy, such as inmates2' or people
involved in certain types of employment.295 Efforts at mandatory
screenings en masse have failed in the past. 2 6 The rationale behind the
prohibition of such testing rests on the premise that the state's goal of
promoting the public health cannot be achieved by testing healthy people. The various state interests listed above embody the same concern.
For example, in promoting preventative care through the early detection
and treatment of genetic disease, the state would have no need to intrude
on a healthy individual's privacy interests, as this individual is not
threatened by genetic disorder.
Mandatory testing is not the least restrictive method of achieving
291. Opponents of genetic screening claim that because treatment opportunities are limited,
the sole purpose of genetic screening is to detect carriers of disease, which may result in pressure
on future parents to avoid having children so that they do not pass on the diseased gene to their
children. See Adelman, supra note 56, at 905.
292. See Robertson, supra note 217, at 698-705 (discussing cystic fibrosis carrier screening
and its importance in family planning decisions).
293. See supraPart lII.A.
294. See supraPart HI.B.I.c.
295. See supraPart IIl.B.l.a., b.
296. Mandatory SCA and HIV testing are examples of the failure of screening en masse. See
supra Parts llI.A.I., 3.b.ii.
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state goals and a voluntary screening program is one example of a practical solution to this problem. Through a voluntary screening program,
members of the population who fear that they are at risk for a genetic
disease, or whose medical histories indicate such a risk will present
themselves for testing. The individual who volunteers has thereby consented to such screening and the state has not unduly intruded on the
individual's privacy interest, either in the Fourth Amendment or in the
Fourteenth Amendment context.
C. Special Consideration:The Impact of Genetic Screening on
Reproductive Decision-Making
1. Viability
Reproductive decision-making has traditionally been left to the
would-be parents, especially the pregnant woman, 9 while the state in299
terest generally remains subordinate until the fetus reaches viability
and is at risk of developing a debilitating disease or dying.2 9 As genetic
technology increases, however, and science begins to more definitively
delineate the boundaries of our biological existence, fundamental rights
of privacy of the pregnant mother may erode because genetic science
may challenge the point of viability as the adequate threshold at which
the state may intervene. For example, increased genetic knowledge already gives scientists the ability to "fix" a genetic problem before a
woman's germ-line egg cell is even fertilized. May the state intervene at
such an early stage to ensure that only genetically healthy fetuses are
created or carried to term?
2. Rebirth of Eugenics
In addition to altering the underlying scientific facts regarding procreation, increased genomic knowledge can potentially sway public
opinion toward eugenics principles. The development of genetic technologies can facilitate such ambitions. For example, germ-line therapy
will provide future parents with medical assurance that their child will
be free from a particular disease. 300 But, not all parents will be able to
comprehend, accept or afford such technology, especially during the in297. See supra text accompanying notes 168-80.
298. See id.
299. See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
300. As a precursor to gene therapy, genetic screening on fetuses may be limited because of
risk to the fetus. Only women who are at high risk of having a child with the particular inheritable
disease may elect this type of screening. See Robertson, supra note 217, at 710.
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troduction of this technology into mainstream society. As a result, not
all children will be born free of certain debilitating genetic diseases.
One commentator has stated that a consequence of the development of

this technology is that "a line must somehow be drawn between children
who should be born and those who should not." 301 While this idea may
seem unconscionable and even morally reprehensible to some, the un-

dercurrent in public America has expressed general approval for selective abortion when a woman is carrying a fetus with a severe defect.",,
The question then becomes, what is to be the standard of "severe genetic defect?" and "who decides this standard?"
These questions spur further inquiry regarding the potential longterm deterioration and perversion of any such standard of genetic normalcy. As genetic testing becomes available, every parent will want not
only a healthy child born free of any disease or predisposition toward
debilitating infirmities, but also may want to use gene therapy to manipulate genes affecting intelligence, height, appearance, and even behavior."3 Parents, in attempting to "design" a child, may feel additional

pressure to provide the best "biological setup" in order to better ensure
their child's future success.3
This kind of reliance on diagnostics could lead to decision-making
based on society's perceptions of the standards of healthy and normal."5

As Jeremy Rifkin, co-founder of the Foundation for Economic Trends,
notes, genetic engineering principles center around quality control, efficiency, and predictability of outcome." He ponders: "'Do parents
continue in the time-honored tradition where children are a gift.... [o]r

301. LEvINE & SuzuKi, supra note 9, at 203.
302. See DworKN, supra note 287, at 32 (revealing that abortions are sought out not only
when genetic defects are found, but also based on the genderof the fetus).
303. See John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV.
421,434-35 (1996).
304. The question aptly arises whether it is the parents' responsibility to do this. See id. at
435-36 (discussing the use of germ-line therapy to control a fetal characteristics and the legal,
ethical, and moral ramifications surrounding such decision-making); see also Ruth Schwartz
Cowan, Genetic Technology and Reproductive Choice: An Ethics for Autonomy, in THE CODE OF
CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOcIAL IssuEs IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECr, supra note 5, at 244,

245-46. Schwartz notes that until genetic cures are found for diseases such as Tay-Sachs and spina
bifida, among others, abortion is the only recourse available for pregnant mothers who want a genetically healthy child. Thus "ethical and social implications of the human genome project are
going to be inextricable from the ethical and social implications of abortion." Id. at 246.
305. Genetic testing also would play an important role beyond the womb. See Brock, supra
note 28, at 21 ("If we gain the capacity to enhance human functioning in significant respects and
on a widespread basis ... by genetic engineering or therapy... the result may be to undermine
our confidence in what is normal human function.").
306. See LEVINE & SuZUKI, supranote 9, at 204.
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do parents see themselves now as architects, as designers, as programmers, for the next generation?"' 7
D. Preferencefor Voluntary Testing
In general, a state should not mandate genetic screening because
the individual's privacy interests outweigh the state's interest in public
health and the risk of communicability of these diseases is limited to inheritability, individual's should be free to choose whether or not to use
genetic screening. Furthermore, in accordance with principles of informed consent, the right of individuals to make informed decisions regarding their health should be preserved.3 s This right includes the right
to be free from undue state interference when making personal decisions

regarding family planning.3 Finally, the various intrusions on individual privacy and the lack of empirical evidence supporting the efficiency,
accuracy, and efficacy of the testing illustrate that mandatory genetic
testing in the context of screening the public is not the least restrictive
means of achieving state goals of promoting public health. The next
section explores the alternative of voluntary testing and sets forth the
necessary elements for implementing an efficient and efficacious pro-

gram narrowly designed to further state goals of promoting the public
health.
VI. COMPONENTS AND COMPLEMENTS OF VOLUNTARY TESTING
A voluntary genetic testing program provides the most practical
compromise in balancing the state interest in public health against individual privacy interests. As previously discussed, genetic disease, unlike

307. Id. There is some dispute over the concept of a fetus as a "gift" since prenatal testing and
the choice of abortion already allow potential parents to reject certain fetuses. With the increased
biological knowledge that genetic screenings and treatments such as gene therapy promote, it is
not clear how much control potential parents will be able to maintain over family planning decisions and, against the moral ideals of some, the genetic quality of their future family.
308. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that a patient has
a right to know information that would be material in making a fully informed health decision).
309. There would be circumstances in which a state, under very limited conditions when a
third party interest was at stake, would have a compelling interest in mandating genetic testing.
The area of the law which continues to generate considerable debate around this issue concerns
legislation permitting the state to intrude on a pregnant woman's privacy rights in order to protect
a newborn or viable fetus from suffering or death and where early detection of genetic disease
could lead to successful treatment without unduly interfering with parental rights of privacy and
autonomy. See supra Parts II.A.3.b.ii, IV.A.4. Consider arguments about the "quality of life" of
the future child. Does less suffering mean that steps must be taken to ensure maximum health, and
does this new genetic health also include beauty, strength, and intelligence?
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highly communicable diseases such as HIV and TB, is limited to inheritability. In evaluating the constitutionality of mandatory medical
screenings, it should be determined whether state compelled public
health measures "are reasonable in light of the nature of the risk and
how high the risk has to be to justify the deprivation of significant lib3 ' The Supreme
erty interests.""
Court has indicated that legislatures have
broad powers to protect the public health and has thus deferred to legislative judgment regarding screening for communicable diseases."' The
Court, however, has warned that the legislature may not curtail fundamental rights such as the right to privacy and autonomy if the risk to the
public health is not sufficiently compelling,3"2 or the provision infringes
on the formally recognized fundamental right to make personal decisions."'
As new genetic knowledge is gained, the potential for improving
the quality and duration of life renews the tension surrounding the point
at which a state interest becomes compelling. The most recent example
is the mandatory ILV testing of newborns in New York-where the
state interest became compelling at the point when medical technology
significantly increased the chances of a newborn's survival with the
early administration of AZT.314 This example clearly illustrates the erosion of the mother's privacy rights. Thus, "[t]he medical decisions of
pregnant women have been among the most likely to be determined and
shaped by social and political interests lying beyond their own judg3 Rather
ments of the best interests of themselves and their families.""
than continuing to encroach on the rights of the pregnant woman or any
individual through mandatory genetic testing, the state would benefit
more from expending its limited available resources on a comprehensive voluntary screening program focusing on education, accessibility of

310. Vincler & Gordon, supra note 83, at 1026; see also School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987). Although Arline considered the rights of a teacher under the Rehabilitation Act to continue
in her job despite her susceptibility to TB, this case sets forth a standard which could be applied,
albeit in a modified form, to the risks associated with genetic disease. Among the factors to be
considered are (1) the method by which the disease is transmitted, (2) the amount of time during
which the carrier is infectious, (3) the risk of contagion, and (4) the impact of harm that the disease
could potentially cause to another. See id. at 288.
311. See supra Part LI.A.2.
312. See supra Part DI.A.3.
313. See supra Part uI.B.2.
314. See supra Part llI.A.3.b.
315. Preface to AIDS, WOMEN, AND THE NEXT GENERATION: ToWARDS A MORALLY
ACCEPTABLE PUBLIC POLICY FOR HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNs at vii
(Ruth R. Faden et al. eds., 1991).
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resources, confidentiality of information, and analysis of genetic test results.
In encouraging a voluntary testing program, the state will be able
to satisfy its goals of protecting the public health while respecting the
fundamental rights of privacy and autonomy in decision-making. As
new genetic discoveries become more frequent, especially as a result of
the Human Genome Project, scientists and physicians can impart this
knowledge in understandable terms to those who may be at risk for genetic disease, to those who would benefit from using this information in
family planning and to those who simply are interested in gaining increased self-biological knowledge. The following components are necessary for the success of a voluntary screening program.
A. Accurate Testing
Any genetic test which enters the market should yield accurate and
unambiguous results. The breast31 6 and ovarian testing317 examples cited
above illustrate the complexity surrounding the administration of genetic tests and use of the results. Specifically, in order for the state to
support its goal of promoting the public health, those individuals seeking testing must be provided with information that will facilitate the
commencement or continuance of treatment. An ambiguous test result
can lead to psychological as well as physical suffering. For example, a
pregnant woman mistakenly assured of the genetic health of her fetus
may continue to carry to term and give birth to a child who may, as a
result of the genetic condition, not live very long or live a life with increased suffering due to genetic disease.
In Creason v. State Department of Health Services, 38 the plaintiff,
a mother, sued the State of California for failing to administer accurate
genetic tests which resulted in her newborn suffering from severe injuries. California's Hereditary Disorders Act mandates that the state
health department test infants for certain genetic and congenital disorders including hypothyroidism, the disease from which the plaintiff's
infant suffered.3 9 At the time of the testing, the state statute required
only that a positive or negative test result be reported rather than the
actual indicator values of thyroxin and thyroid hormone. 2 The plain-

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See supranote 271 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 203-05 and accompanying text.
64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534 (Ct. App. 1997).
See id.at 535, 536.
See iU at 537.
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tiff's infant had low values, but one of the values was in "normal
range," thereby creating a negative test result.3 2' Based on this information, the infant received no treatment within the first three months of
birth, which led to the onset of severe, irreversible injury. The California Court of Appeals held that since the statue required medical screenings to be conducted in accordance with generally accepted medical
principles and that clinical testing procedures be accurate and provide
maximum information, imposing obligations on the state to conduct accurate tests yielding results that are subject to minimum misinterpretation would best reflect the legislature's intent."f Finally, the court concluded that the parents claims, if proven true,
would establish a breach
3z
of a mandatory duty on the part of the state.
B. Availability of Curesor Treatments
As discussed above, it is necessary that cures or treatments be
available in order to support a legitimate purpose in screening an individual. As in the example of HIV, the development of AZT led to the
acceptability and widespread use of HIV testing and, in the case of
newborns, even led to compelled testing due to the highly beneficial effects of the drug on the infants.3"
In some instances, treatment or cures may not be available, but
screening will still hold a legitimate purpose. Screening for Huntington's Disease enables individuals to learn the probability of the onset of
this deadly disease. Attaining this knowledge before becoming symptomatic allows those who will suffer from the disease to plan for premature severe disability and eventual death. In contrast, those who discover
that they do not carry the gene or that there is a low probability of inheritance will be free to enjoy aspects of their life that they may have
otherwise forgone, such as having children. In either circumstance, patients must be made aware of the fact that no cure or treatment is available before submitting to testing. A voluntary testing program allows
the individual to approach testing when they feel it is necessary and
when they understand the importance of such screening.

321. See id.

322. See id.
323. See id.
324. In many cases, early administration of AZT can lead to the eradication of HV in the
infant. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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C. Public Education
Primary to the success of any voluntary genetic screening program
is public education. The public needs to be aware of the availability of
genetic testing and to understand fundamentals of genetic technology
and the benefits and risks associated with the particular genetic screening program being implemented.3" The education program must indicate
the accuracy rate of such tests. Also, the genetic disease itself needs to
be understood in order to comprehend the importance of the genetic test
and the impact of the treatment that is available. For example, as with
PKU testing of newborns, 326 once parents understand the nature of the
disease, such as its potential to be inherited by their children, its effect
on their children and the effects of environmental factors, a simple dietary change and monitoring of the child is generally all that is required
to promote relatively normal development. 27 Ideally, the educational
materials should be adjusted for each sector within a community so that
adults with differing degrees of education will be able to fully comprehend the meaning of the information presented.
D. Informed Consent
As a result of public confidence in the accuracy and potential
benefits of genetic testing, the state will, in effect, be fostering individual responsibility for genetic health decisions.3" This responsibility rests
on strong foundations of American acceptance of the informed consent

325. This educational need is similar to that for IUV testing. See Post, supra note 111, at 222.
The state should educate the public about transmission, prevention, voluntary testing, available
treatment, and support services for adults and children regarding other genetic diseases as well.
326. See supranotes 197-99 and accompanying text.
327. See supranote 199 and accompanying text.
328. Encouraging people to accept responsibility for personal decision-making recognizes
that the values the state is attempting to protect through a voluntary screening program are
"contestable." See DwoRKiN, supra note 287, at 151.
The sanctity of life is a highly controversial, contestable value. It is controversial, for
example, whether abortion or childbirth best serves the intrinsic value of life when a
fetus is deformed .... Does a state protect a contestable value best by encouraging
people to accept it as contestable, understanding that they are responsible for deciding
for themselves what it means? Or does the state protect a contestable value best by itself deciding, through the political process, which interpretation is the right one, and
then forcing everyone to conform?
Id. This Note proposes that a voluntary genetic testing program avoids the potential of conformity
through legislation and respects the precedent establishing the right of autonomous decisionmaking by looking on the majority of individuals as capable of making informed decisions about
their personal health and related issues, and by providing education to increase the amount of understanding and awareness among these people.
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doctrine 9 and, therefore, necessitates the dedication of resources for
services such as pre-test counseling.
Pre-test counseling should be provided in order to ensure that individuals being tested and members of the individual's family understand the ramifications of a negative or positive test result. This is es-

pecially imperative when a positive test result signifies future imminent
death or loss of one's faculties. 330 Pre-test counseling also introduces the
patient to the particular administrative forms which need to be completed prior to the screening as well as to the procedures involved in the
testing itself; this will enable the patient to have a more thorough understanding of the screening as well as foster trust in the legitimacy of
the publicized goals behind the screening.
The availability of resources for continual treatment should also be
discussed so that the patient knows where to access the necessary medical and psychological care.3" Therefore, if a patient tests positive, the
administering body would make the appropriate referrals so that the patient may receive adequate treatment, taking special care not to unnecessarily disclose information to specialists.
E. Post-ScreeningResources
A concern arises with regard to the accessibility of post-screening
resources. If patients are aware of the available resources but cannot af-

ford further care, does the state have a responsibility to provide for
some basic follow-up care?332 A voluntary testing program allows the
329. See Robert Schwartz & Andrew Grubb, Why Britain Can't Afford Informed Consent,
HASTINGS CrR. REP., Aug. 1985, at 19, 20 (discussing America's reliance on patient-based informed consent and contrasting it with Britain's physician-based standard).
330. It is important that counselors do not encourage the patient to toward or against genetic
screening. For a discussion about the responsibilities of counselors in ensuring the patient's
autonomous decision to undergo screening, see GENIc COUNSELLING: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 46-49 (Angus Clarke ed., 1994).
331. Opponents of voluntary testing argue that mandatory testing ensures that all individuals
will be provided with the necessary information to make informed decisions, and that if left to society, the medical community will fail to responsibly assure that the patients have this information.
See Juliet J. McKenna, Where Ignorance Is Not Bliss: A Proposal for Mandatory HIV Testing of
Pregnant Women, 7 STAN. L. & PoL'y REv. 133, 136-37 (1996), for a discussion about the availability of syphilis testing and the reluctance of doctors and patients to use it voluntarily because
doctors feared offending patients and patients feared stigmatization. "Physicians' ... failure to
incorporate syphilis screening into routine practice indicates that legislative mandates may be necessary to overcome physicians' reluctance to test patients for diseases which carry a stigma." Id. at
137.
332. Would the state, for example, be required to fund a limited amount of therapeutic visits
or needed injections? While the answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Note, the issue
is of absolute importance. One would think that the state does owe some responsibility to these

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol26/iss2/7

60

Raffone: The Human Genome Project: Genetic Screening and the Fundamental R
1997]

HUMAN GENOME PROJECT

state to allocate necessary resources according to a legislative determi-

nation of need. Alternatively, a mandatory testing program would support the argument that if the state interferes without consent into an individual's health concerns, and as a consequence, the individual gains
knowledge that a genetic disease is present in their genome, the state
must then provide the necessary treatments to mitigate the suffering associated with the disease in order to meet its goals of protecting the
public health or potential life. Without these treatments the state's inter-

est would seem to rest on an unsecure foundation.333
F. Timely Notification of Test Results
Often, treatment success rates depend upon early intervention;
therefore, patients must be provided with timely notification of the test
results. Currently, this is a special concern for screenings such as the
HIV screening of newborns. 31 In order to maximize the effectiveness of
genetic screening, tests should be developed and facilities made available so that results are provided before any potential or further damage
to self or child occurs. In order for this to be a practical consideration,
funding will be needed 335 to ensure quick turnaround time from highly
capable and efficient laboratories.

individuals, but difficulties in line drawing arise. For example, does the state's responsibility end
with the disclosure of a positive test result? The boundaries of state responsibility will rest with the
legislature.
333. Possible solutions to this question are beyond the scope of this Note. This issue is mentioned to illustrate a potential financially adverse consequence of genetic testing; however, this
issue will most likely be addressed by a cost benefit analysis of a voluntary screening program.
334. SeePost,supranote111, at 180.
[A] serious drawback to neonatal HIV screening is the delay in obtaining test results.
Because ... tests must be performed in specialized laboratories, the turnaround time
varies from several days to weeks .... By that time, most mothers and newborns will
have left the hospital without knowing their test results. Of particular concern is that
women who intend to breastfeed will have already begun to do so, potentially exposing
their infants to HIV.
Id. at 180-81.
335. Proposals for the method and sources of funding are beyond the scope of this Note. It
should be noted, however, that in order to justify its goal in enacting such a screening program, the
state may be compelled to produce a certain percentage, if not all, of the funding necessary to ensure high quality and efficient lab work. In addition, there probably will be a strong interest in
joint ventures or the privatization of biotech companies who can consistently monitor and improve
the genetic testing.
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G. Confidentiality of Information
As the public becomes more aware of genetic testing and gains a
better understanding of how it can improve their lives, participation in a
voluntary program will increase incrementally. One key measure which
must be present throughout every stage of the process is the maintenance of confidentiality of patient information. There needs to be a
system in place whereby positive test results do not become part of the
patient's medical record in the traditional fashion. Security measures
must be implemented so that test administrators, diagnosing physicians
and patient care givers can monitor progress without outside physicians,
employers and insurance agencies obtaining unauthorized access to the
information.?3 The state should review the current mechanisms of limiting patient and third party access to medical records so that any existing
loopholes can be eliminated according to the legislature's best judgment. 37
H. Monitoringof the Success of the Programand Continual
Implementation of Scientific Findings
The need for accurate medical information and further scientific
research is important for improving the integrity and usefulness of genetic screening. As genetic screening becomes more prevalent on a voluntary basis, it is necessary to have an expert administrative body
monitor the screening to determine whether it meets the state objectives
of promoting public health. In the instance where genetic screening is
highly successful at reducing or eradicating a particular disease, this
administrative body should decide whether the program should become
part of standard medical practice.335 In the event that a voluntary
screening program does not effectively achieve state goals, the state
should discontinue the effort.

336. For example, as with mandatory HIV testing, if the newborn tests positive for HIV and
this information is placed in the newborn's medical record, the mother's HIV status by implication
is known to whomever reads her child's charts.
337. See Comprehensive Newborn HIV Screening Program, 19 N.Y. St. Reg. 11, 13 (1997).
338. Other programs have supported this idea. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f
(McKinney Supp. 1997) (providing for a comprehensive HIV testing program for newborns).
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VII.

CONCLUSION

339

[Tihe constitutional challenges raised as a direct consequence of the
startling advances in bio-science are unique, for they hold every
promise of changing some of the most fundamental principles of this
country's political order-challenges "that the individual human being
is autonomous and exercises free will, that all people are entitled to
equal treatment, [and] that individuals enjoy a legitimate expectation
of privacy in their dealings with the state .... o
The completion of the Human Genome Project will mark a major
step in the advancement of genetic understanding. The knowledge
gained from the continued research on, and completion of, the Human
Genome Project can be used by the state to lessen the suffering associated with over 4,000 discovered genetic diseases through the implementation of genetic screening programs. In considering whether or not to
mandate such programs for high risk groups, the state's interest in promoting genetic health must be balanced against individual rights to privacy.
It is unquestioned that genetic screening facilitates early detection
of genetic disease, thus promoting prevention or reduction of severe suffering. These state interests are legitimate and may even be deemed
compelling in the context of a deadly or severely debilitating genetic
disease; however, the success of such an analysis depends upon many
factors, including the availability of treatment, accuracy of testing results, identification of high risk groups, and confidentiality of genetic
information.
Consideration of privacy rights reveals the establishment of an individual's right to freedom from unreasonable searches, selective disclosure of personal information and autonomous personal health care
decisions without undue interference from the state. A balancing test
concludes that a mandatory screening program is generally not the least
restrictive method by which to achieve state goals in promoting the
public health.
339. While funding is a vital concern, it is beyond the scope of this Note. It should be noted
however, that by utilizing the least restrictive means, government is able to "eschew[ ] gratuitous
or unnecessary cost" thereby enabling the state to concentrate its efforts on the efficient allocation
of resources, as well as securing the funding needed to promote a successful voluntary screening
program. Roy G. Spece, Jr., The Most Effective or Least Restrictive Alternative as the Only Intermediate and Only Means-FocusedReview in Due Processand Equal Protection,33 VIL. L. REv.
111, 113 n.2 (1988).
340. Smith & Burns, supra note 4, at 60 (quoting Sheila Jasanoff, Biology and the Bill of
Rights: Can Science Reframe the Constitution?,13 AM. J.L. & MED. 249, 287 (1987)).
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A voluntary screening program is a viable and cost-efficient solution. It encourages responsibility on the part of the individual to make
informed health care decisions, while at the same time fostering the
state interests in promoting the public health. The ultimate result is patient cooperation, increased integrity and respect for the medical community, and a more efficient use of genetic screening technology as secured through the guidance and protection-rather than intrusion-of
the state under its police powers.
As scientific endeavors continue to exponentially advance, scientific support for genetic screening will buttress the usefulness and viability of such programs. It is not unforeseeable that with future developments it will be possible for individuals to rid themselves and their
progeny of genetic disease. The question remains then, will "the individual's right to make certain unusually important decisions
that ...affect his own, or his family's destiny"'14 be preserved or will
future genetic advancement enable the state to steadily increase its intrusion into the privacy of individuals under its police power eventually
resulting in the implementation of mandatory genetic screening programs?
KristinM. Raffone*

341. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2259, 2307 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem. Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)) (emphasis
added).
* This Note was inspired by the courageous struggle for life of Baby Alyssa Anne Mushin,
a victim of a fatal genetic disease. It is with thoughts of her that I have worked to formulate this
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it. Special thanks to Professor Alan Lambert for his insight and criticism and to Robert Andrew
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